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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3) (2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion for

preliminary injunction?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in refusing of injunction
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, f 16, 13 P.3d 581 (citing Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust,
972 P.2d 411,412 (Utah 1998)). The reviewing court "considers] whether the trial court
used sound equitable principles based on all of the facts and circumstances." Id. (citing
Aquagen, supra, at 412-13).
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a
motion for preliminary injunction. (R. 82-96.) The trial court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by Appellees. (R. 589-608.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a dispute over the ownership of real property located in Honeyville, Utah.

The Appellant, Centro de la Familia de Utah (" CDLF"), is the principal provider of
Migrant Head Start services in Utah. It is CDLF's contention that Appellee Dream
1

Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser"), acting through Appellee Bonita Carter ("Carter"),
orally agreed to convey title of the old Honeyville Elementary School to CDLF. In return,
CDLF agreed to refurbish the property and locate a Migrant Head Start Program there.
Mrs. Carter and her husband, David Carter, paid $72,500 to the Box Elder School
District to purchase the surplus property. CDLF incurred expenses of more than $680,000
to improve the property and otherwise bring it into compliance with Head Start Program
guidelines. Since June 1, 2002, it has operated a migrant Head Start Program at the
Property, and currently provides services to up to 172 young children of migrant families
in Northern Utah and Southern Idaho.
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court' s denial of CDLF's motion for
preliminary injunction to stay eviction from the property.

The main issue for

determination is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that CDLF
cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim
for breach of oral contract; and, in particular, whether the doctrine of part performance
places the oral agreement to convey outside the Statute of Frauds.
The Carters do not dispute that CDLF satisfies three of the four elements of the part
performance exception (/. e., the improvements made on the property were substantial and
valuable; valuable consideration was given; and possession was actual and open). They
do object, however, to the existence of the oral agreement to convey, and the requirement

2

that the substantial improvements to the property were exclusively referable to the oral
agreement.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
On May 31, 2002, CDLF filed a Complaint against Mrs. Carter, Dream Chaser,

and The Carter Family Foundation (which at one time purported to own the subject real
property) (the Appellees are collectively hereinafter referred to as the "Carters") after
they refused to convey title of the property. The Amended Complaint generally alleges
ownership of the real property, and seeks specific performance on the breach of contract
claim. The Amended Complaint also includes claims for quiet title, unjust enrichment and
fraud. The Cartersfiledan Answer and Counterclaim, which generally seeks to quiet title
in Dream Chaser.
After the exchange of initial pleadings, the parties discussed settlement. In early
February 2003, the Carters "revoke[d] all prior offers," and twice demanded in writing
that CDLF "vacate the premises immediately." (R. 279; 361.) To prevent the eviction
from going forward (the prior two-year lease agreement had expired on October 1, 2002),
CDLF filed a motion for preliminary injunction to allow it to continue to occupy the
Honeyville center until the ownership dispute is resolved. The parties agreed that a
temporary restraining order hearing would not be necessary, and submitted to an
abbreviated briefing schedule.

3

The parties submitted numerous affidavits in support of their respective positions.
These affidavits conflicted in fundamental ways. For instance, CDLF's attorney swears
under oath that the Carters promised to convey the property, and the Carters' attorney
claims in his affidavit they did not. Although the credibility of witnesses is clearly at
issue, the trial court did not take live testimony in court, asked no questions of counsel at
oral argument, and adopted wholesale the Carters one-sided findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The trial court heard oral argument on March 31, 2003. In a Minute Entry Ruling
dated April 2, 2003, Judge J. Dennis Frederick denied CDLF's motion for preliminary
injunction "for the reasons specified in the opposing memoranda and as articulated at oral
argument." (R. 550.) The Carters submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. CDLF filed objections to those findings and conclusions as not being supported
by the affidavit evidence. The Carters responded by filing amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which the trial court entered without amendment in a Minute Entry
Ruling dated May 6, 2003. CDLF subsequently filed a timely petition for interlocutory
appeal, which was granted by this Court by Order dated July 10, 2003.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Appellant and Plaintiff, Centro de la Familia de Utah, is a Utah nonprofit

corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. CDLF
provides educational and advocacy services to migrant and Hispanic communities
4

throughout Utah, and is the only provider of Migrant and Season Head Start services in
this state. (R. 156, 1 2.)
2.

Defendant Bonita Carter is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.

Mrs. Carter is the Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation. She is named as a Defendant
in this action both in her individual capacity and as Trustee of the Foundation. The
Foundation is a Utah nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, Utah. (R. 13, f 2; 281, 1 1.)
3.

Defendant Dream Chaser, L.L.C. is a Utah limited liability company with

its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Dream Chaser purports to own
fee title of the real property that is the subject matter of this action. (R. 13, f 3.)
CDLF Seeks a Property in Northern Utah
4.

In 1998, CDLF became aware that its lease at the Intermountain Indian

School in Brigham City would not be renewed because the property was to be sold to a
developer. (R. 462, f 2.) Soon after that, in 1999, CDLF secured about $6000,000 of
federal government grant funding to locate a Head Start Program elsewhere in Northern
Utah. At the same time, CDLF publicly expressed its interest in establishing a Head Start
program in Southern Box Elder County or Northern Davis County. With the grant funds
in hand, CDLF located and took steps designed to purchase a surplus elementary school
in North Ogden. This effort was dropped after community opposition was voiced. (R.
467, J 2.)
5

5.

Acting through its Regional Site Manager for Northern Utah, Tom Hogan

("Hogan"), CDLF began scouting other locations. Mr. Hogan heard that the Box Elder
School District planned to close the Honeyville Elementary School (the "Property") and
had declared it surplus property. (R. 462, % 3.) In a letter to the Box Elder School
District dated April 18, 2000, Mr. Hogan expressed CDLF's interest in acquiring the
Property. (R. 370-1.) In or about April 2000, Mr. Hogan began attending the School
District Board meetings. If possible, he hoped to convince the School District Board to
give the Property to CDLF to be used as a Migrant Head Start Program. (R. 462, f 3.)
CDLF had determined, however, that in the event the School District Board was not
prepared to give the Property to CDLF, then CDLF would attempt to purchase it for a
suitable price using a portion of the $600,000 it had on hand, just as it had intended to
purchase the North Ogden elementary school. (R. 467, f 3.)
6.

CDLF was subsequently informed that the School District Board would not

donate the Property to it. Bonnie Carter then stepped forward. (R. 462, \ 4.)
Initial Contacts Between Bonnie Carter and CDLF
7.

In early June 2000, Mrs. Carter contacted Mr. Hogan. She told Mr. Hogan

that she had read in the newspaper that CDLF wanted to locate a Head Start Program at
the Property, and that the School District Board had declined to give it to CDLF. She
also said that she knew the School District Board was considering selling the Property to
a developer who planned to tear down the building and build homes on the site; had
6

attended Honeyville Elementary School as a child, and did not want to see the school torn
down and houses built there; and wanted to preserve the building, and see it continue to
be used as an educational center. (R. 462, f 5.)
8.

Mrs. Carter told Mr. Hogan "we're going to get you this building," or

words to that affect. Even in this initial contact, Mrs. Carter said her husband had recently
sold his interest in a software company, and they wanted to acquire the Property to give
it to CDLF so that they could claim a charitable deduction to reduce their tax burden. (R.
462, 1 6.)
9.

Mr. Hogan referred Mrs. Carter to CDLF' s CEO, Graciela Italiano-Thomas

("Thomas"). Mrs. Carter immediately contacted Ms. Thomas, and during this initial
telephone conversation, Mrs. Carter said: "Since the [Box Elder] School District won't
give it [the school] to you, I will." (R. 467, 1 4.)
10.

On June 8, 2000, Mrs. Carter met for the first time with Ms. Thomas and

Robert Leonard, CDLF's Director of Operations, at CDLF's offices in Salt Lake.
During that meeting, Mrs. Carter repeated her earlier statements to Mr. Hogan that she
and her husband would like to purchase the Property and give it to CDLF because they
wanted to claim a charitable tax deduction. (R. 467-8, ft

5-6.) During this meeting,

Ms. Thomas informed Mrs. Carter that CDLF had at least half a million dollars available
to make the needed improvements to the Property and otherwise bring it into compliance
with Head Start Program guidelines. (R. 467, 1 8.)
7

11.

Ms. Thomas responded that locating CDLF's Head Start Program at the

Honeyville Elementary School would satisfy each of Mrs. Carter's state desires that the
Property should not be torn down, and that it should continue to be used as an educational
center. She told Mrs. Carter that even though CDLF already had funding to purchase the
Property, a donation of the Property would free up funding to further improve it and
provide expanded services. On behalf of CDLF, Ms. Thomas enthusiastically accepted
Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to finalize plans to convey the Property. (R. 468, t
7.)
12.

The next day, Ms. Thomas sent Mrs. Carter a letter thanking her for her

" generous proposal." "It is by far the largest gift our agency has ever been offered,"
Ms. Thomas wrote. (R. 129; Appendix A hereto.)
13.

Relying on Mrs. Carter's representations that she would purchase the

Property and convey it, CDLF withdrew any attempt to independently acquire the
Property. (R. 365, f 15.)
The Second Meeting with the Carters
14.

In July 2000, Mrs. Carter and her husband, David Carter, met with Ms.

Thomas and CDLF's attorney, Scott Hansen ("Hansen"), at CDLF's offices, to discuss
conveyance of the Property. At this meeting, Mr. Carter said he and his wife intended to
convey the Property to CDLF, but they wanted to push the actual conveyance back until
after CDLF had used its funds to improve the Property. Mr. Carter explained in detail his
8

intention to convey the Property to CDLF and claim a charitable tax deduction from the
transfer based not on the amount the Carters had already offered to pay the School District
in cash (i.e., $30,000), but rather the value of the Property after the anticipated
improvements were made. (R. 468, f 9.)
15.

Up to that point, Mrs. Carter had said she and her husband intended to

purchase the Property in August and immediately convey it to CDLF. CDLF decided,
however, that the Carters' proposal to delay the conveyance presented no obstacle because
the improvements would take one to one and one-half years to complete, and the Carters
had made a firm commitment to convey the Property. At the meeting in July 2000, Mr.
Carter specifically stated that he and his wife would transfer ownership of the Property to
CDLF, and in return he expected CDLF to expend the substantial funds it had on hand to
improve the Property. (R. 469, if 10.)
16.

Later in the month of July 2000, Mrs. Carter as well as Ms. Thomas and Mr.

Hogan together attended a School District Board meeting to consider the Carters' offer
to purchase the Property for $30,000. After the School District Board withdrew to
deliberate on the offer in closed session, Ms. Carter told Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hogan that
she and her husband intended to buy the Property at the lowest cost possible, but claim a
charitable tax deduction equal to the actual appraised value they would receive by giving

9

the Property to CDLF. She said the Property was worth more than their offer of $30,060
(R. 463, 17.)
The Carters Close on the Property
17.

The School District Board rejected the Carters'

offer of $30,000.

Negotiations continued. At a School District Board meeting on September 27, 2000, the
Board accepted the Carters' offer of $72,500. (R. 365, 11

11-12.) At the meeting,

Ronald Frandsen, the School District's Administrative Assistant/Business, reported that,
based on his discussions with Mrs. Carter, the Carters "intended to gift the Property to
CDLF for use in its Migrant Head Start Program." (R. 365,1 13.) The School District
Board's Minutes recorded the following: "Mr. And Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City
have offered to purchase the property for a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift
the property in turn to Centro de la Familia de Utah for use in their program." (R. 381;
Appendix B hereto.) Mr. Carter spoke at the meeting. Ms. Thomas attended the meeting
as well and heard nothing from the Carters that led her to believe the deal was anything
other than what she and the Carters had agreed upon at their second meeting in July 2002.
(R. 469, 1 11.) The School District Board voted to approve the sale, and the next day
title was transferred. (R. 366,1 16.) Ms. Thomas attended the closing. (R. 469,1 11.)

1

An appraisal that was completed in February March 2002 estimated that the Property was
valued at $450,000 after the improvements were made. Mr. Hansen's second affidavit refers
to the appraisal but, through inadvertence, it was not attached thereto.
10

18.

A few days later, on September 30, 2000, a Northern Utah newspaper, the

Standard-Examiner, reported that Mrs. Carter "has promised her school to Centro de la
Familia, a Hispanic advocacy group, for its migrant Head Start program in southern Box
Elder County." The article quoted Mrs. Carter as saying: "VI kind of made that dream
happen,' she said. NHopefully I can help other people's dreams too.'" "The Carters
and Centro de la Familia are still working out when the building will switch hands, but
Bonnie Carter said she'd like to see the group in the building as soon as possible." (R.
117; Appendix C hereto.) Another local newspaper, the Box Elder News Journal, shows
a picture of Mrs. Carter shaking hands with Mr. Frandsen, and includes a caption which
states: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and plan on turning the
property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start program." ( R.
118; Appendix D hereto.)
The Lease Agreement
19.

Before the closing on September 28, Mrs. Carter told Ms. Thomas she would

like CDLF to sign a lease agreement to cover the period needed to improve the Property.
(R. 469, 1f 13.) A day after the closing, Ms. Thomas made a report to CDLF's Board
of Directors concerning the conveyance. The Minutes of that meeting state, in relevant
part: "Honeyville has been signed and bought by the Carters. We will enter into a rental
agreement with the Carters. They will donate the monthly rent until they pass title to
CDLF in a few months." (R. 477; Appendix E hereto.)
11

20.

Ms. Thomas was not surprised by Mrs. Carter's request since the Carters

had already asked to wait until the improvements were completed before conveying the
Property. It was anticipated that those improvements could take up to one and one-half
years to complete, and CDLF thought it would be prudent to formalize the parties'
relationship during this period. (R. 469-70, if 13.)
21.

The lease agreement to rent the Property, and the oral agreement to convey

title of the Property, were entirely separate agreements. The lease agreement (Appendix
F hereto) was only designed to cover the period needed to complete the improvements, and
had a term of only two years. (R. 470, if 14.)
22.

On or about October 5, 2000, the Carters' attorney, Jay Bell ("Bell"), sent

CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, an e-mail attaching a form lease agreement that Mr. Bell
said he had used in the past. (R. 324, if 6; 440, if 4; Appendix G hereto.) He and Mr.
Hansen discussed the duration of the lease, and agreed that two years would provide
enough time for CDLF to complete the improvements. (R. 440, if 4.)
23.

The form lease agreement makes explicit reference to the consideration given

by CDLF in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent-free during the period
needed to complete the improvements. The page one recital states: "In consideration of
the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of this lease, to pay taxes and
insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties hereinafter set forth,
it is agreed as follows:". (R. 290; Appendix F hereto.)
12

24.

The "covenant to maintain the property" referenced in the recital is found

in Paragraph 6 of the lease agreement, which is entitled "Repair and Care of Building by
Tenant." It contains a clause that states:
Tenant may at its own cost and expense, and in a good and workmanlike
manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the
conduct of its business without, however, materially altering the basic
character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure on the
Premises.
An additional clause within Paragraph 6 states: "Any alterations or improvements to the
Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination
of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided." (R. 291-2; Appendix F hereto.)
25.

Even though the lease agreement underwent at least three different drafts

before a final version was agreed upon, Paragraph 6 was substantively unchanged from the
form document that Mr. Bell initially delivered to Mr. Hansen by e-mail. (R. 441, f 6.)
During the month that it took to finalize the lease agreement, Mr. Bell and Mr. Hansen
had no substantive discussion about the contents of Paragraph 6. Based on his prior
experience as a transactional attorney, Mr. Hansen understood Paragraph 6 to contain
boilerplate language found in most commercial lease agreements. (R. 441, f 7.)
26.

CDLF never intended or agreed that the substantial improvements it made

to the Property would be referable to Paragraph 6 of the lease agreement. Instead, the
commitment to make the improvements, and to occupy the premises after the expiration
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of the two year lease, were strictly referable to the oral agreement to convey. (R. 470, f
15; 441, 1f9.)
The Improvements to the Property
27.

Most of the improvements CDLF made to the Property altered both the basic

character of the building and the prior existing improvements. The Property had been
operated as an elementary school serving children ages kindergarten through sixth grade.
The Head Start Program planned for the Property would serve children ages two months
through five years of age. Further, unlike a public elementary school, the Head Start
Program provides daycare, health, nutrition and educational programs to the children. (R.
470, if 16.) Consequently, the Carters purchased the building for only $72,500, but
CDLF had to expend an additional $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with
Head Start Program requirements.
28.

To do so, CDLF's contractor tore down walls, constructed pony walls,

reconfigured bathrooms and classrooms, installed smaller, age-appropriate playgrounds,
installed fences, and generally reconfigured the premises from solely an educational center
for school age children to a social services and educational center for babies, toddlers and
pre-schoolers. (R. 470, f 17.)
29.

Immediately after the Carters purchased the Property on September 28,2000,

CDLF began the process of altering and improving the Property to locate a Head Start
Program there. On October 16, 2000, Ms. Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for
14

Architect" letters to certain local architects; and on November 8, 2000, she issued
"Request for Architect Interviews" letters. On or about December 19,2000, Work House
Architects was retained as architect of the " remodel of the existing building." Work
House first invoiced CDLF on February 1, 2001. As of March 14, 2001, CDLF had paid
Work House $13,320 for services rendered. The contractor, Todd Jensen Construction,
was retained on April 11,2001. CDLF paid the architect $42,000; theflooringcontractor
$49,205.35; and the contractor $586,133.06. In total, CDLF expended $680,590.91 to
complete the improvements. (R. 470-1, f18-22.)
30.

The architect and construction work took about one and one-half years to

complete. CDLF began occupying the premises on June 1, 2002. (R. 471, f 23.)
Subsequent Contacts Between Mrs. Carter and CDLF
31.

After the Carters closed on the Property at the end of September 2000, Ms.

Thomas made a point of telephoning Mrs. Carter about every four to six weeks. These
regular contacts continued until the Spring of 2002. During this period, Ms. Thomas kept
Mrs. Carter informed of the progress of the improvements. At no time during any of these
conversations did Mrs. Carter ever tell Ms. Thomas that she and her husband did not
intend to convey title of the Property to CDLF. (R. 471, % 24.)
32.

In May 2001, CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, asked Mrs. Carter's

attorney, Mr. Bell, to initiate the preparation of the deed to convey the Property to CDLF.
In reliance on Mr. Bell's statement that Mrs. Carter intended to convey title, and with his
15

agreement, Mr. Hansen assisted CDLF in arranging for an appraisal to be performed by
an appraiser designated by Bank of Utah, a proposed lender to CDLF. CDLF planned
to purchase a new administrative center in Salt Lake, and it hoped to use the Property to
collateralize that purchase. (R. 442, 1 11.) The appraisal was completed in February
2002, and showed that CDLF's improvements had increased the value of the Property.
33.

In its 2000 Annual Report, CDLF showed a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Carter

next to the following caption: " Centro de la Familia de Utah would like to express our
utmost appreciation to David & Bonnie Carter for their exceptional vision and foresight.
Their very generous donation of the HoneyviUe School in Northern Utah will allow us to
serve an expanding population of migrant families in the Northern Utah area and
perpetuates the legacy of a building built to serve the community's educational needs."
(R. 547; Appendix H hereto.) CDLF sent the Carters a copy of the 2000 Annual Report
in the Fall of 2001. The Carters never informed CDLF of any objection to the caption's
statement that the Carters would be giving the Property to CDLF. (R. 471-2, 1 25.)
34.

As the construction of the improvements were concluding in the Spring of

2002, Ms. Thomas contacted Mrs. Carter. During this telephone conversation, Ms.
Thomas asked Mrs. Carter when CDLF could expect to receive title of the Property. Mrs.
Carter responded, for the first time ever, that she and her husband had decided not to
convey the Property to CDLF. She gave as her reason: "We don't agree with your
mortgaging the building." Ms. Thomas responded fine, we will make no encumbrances
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a condition of the conveyance, but CDLF wants title. Mrs. Carter then said: "I can't
give you the south parcel." Ms. Thomas responded fine, the Carters should convey
whatever they have. Mrs. Carter then referred to her letter of March 23, 2001, and
replied that the Property belongs to Dream Chaser, and the Carters would only be willing
to lease the Property in perpetuity. The conversation ended, and Ms. Thomas and Mrs.
Carter never spoke again. (R. 472, 1 26.)
The March 23, 2001 Letter
35.

Ms. Thomas received Mrs. Carter's letter of March 23, 2001 (Appendix I

hereto), but she did not act on it. After consultation with counsel, Ms. Thomas determined
that it was a unilateral offer to modify the agreement to convey the Property, and CDLF
would not accept that proposal. The Carters had made a firm commitment to convey the
Property, and CDLF intended to hold them to that promise. Mrs. Carter never raised the
letter in any conversation before the Spring of 2002. (R. 472, f 27.)
36.

In March 2002, at the completion of the improvements, CDLF formally

asked Mrs. Carter to convey the Property. (R. 345-8.) Mrs. Carter refused, stating,
through her attorney, that she had changed her mind. (R. 442, % 14.) The request was
repeated a month later in a letter from CDLF's counsel. (R. 351.)
37.

On May 31, 2002, CDLF filed a Verified Complaint generally seeking

rescission of the agreement to convey, and recovery of the value of the improvements.
Mrs. Carter and the other Defendants filed an Answer and a Counterclaim generally
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seeking a declaratory judgment that there is no agreement to convey, and a judgment
rescinding the letter of March 23, 2001, which offered to continue the Lease Agreement
in perpetuity. (R. 1-9.)
38.

Soon after that, the parties, through their counsel, began discussing a

settlement of this dispute. (R. 113, f 15.)
39.

In a letter dated February 12,2003, Mr. Bell stated that all prior offers were

revoked, and demanded that CDLF "vacate the leased premises immediately." Mr. Bell
also demanded payment of holdover rent of $5,000 per month, beginning in October 1,
2002, when the lease agreement expired. (R. 361.) A second written demand that CDLF
"vacate the premises immediately" was delivered two weeks later.2 (R. 279.)

2

The Carters have not, to date, taken steps to evict CDLF from the premises or
collect holdover rent. At the same time, though, the Carter have been unwilling to enter
into any formal agreement that would allow to CDLF to continue to occupy the premises
during the pendency of the litigation. After the trial court's denial of CDLF's motion
for preliminary injunction, CDLF's counsel requested that the parties agree to stay the
status quo, but the Carters, through their counsel, have refused. Accordingly, CDLF is
subject to eviction at any time since the lease agreement expired on October 1, 2002.
The fact that the Carters have failed to follow through on their demand that CDLF
vacate the premises implies an ulterior motive on their part. It appears the eviction
demand may have been a ploy to force CDLF to effectively try its case without the benefit
of discovery or deliberation. By forcing CDLF to seek an injunction before the parties had
even exchanged initial disclosures, the Carters were able to accelerate the ordinary
progression of a civil case, to the prejudice of CDLF. It was denied, for instance, the
opportunity to depose the Carters and their transactional attorney, Jay Bell, and to obtain
copies of tax returns and attorney files. The trial court's refusal to hear live testimony
certainly compounded this prejudice to CDLF.
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40.

On February 21, 2003, CDLF filed a Motion for Leave to File a First

Amended Complaint, which requests specific performance of the agreement to convey the
Property, and otherwise asserts rightful ownership of the same. (R. 471-2.)
41.

On March 6, 2003, CDLF filed a motion for preliminary injunction to stay

the impending eviction. (R. 82-124.) The parties briefed the matter, and filed competing
affidavits. The trial court heard oral argument on March 31, 2003. The trial court
received no live testimony at the hearing, and asked no questions of counsel. (Hearing
transcript attached hereto as Appendix J.) In a Minute Entry Ruling dated April 2, 2003,
the trial court denied CDLF's motion for preliminary injunction. (R. 550; Appendix K
hereto.)
42.

The Carters then submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

CDLF objected to the proposed findings and conclusions as not supported by the evidence
of record. (R. 554-63.) The Carters submitted amended findings and conclusions (R. 591608; Appendix L hereto), which the trial court entered without amendment in a Minute
Entry Ruling dated May 6, 2003 (R. 589; Appendix M hereto).
43.

On May 19,2003, CDLF filed a petition for permission to appeal. By Order

dated July 10, 2003, this Court granted that petition. (R. 610.)
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44.

Through its Honeyville facility, CDLF presently provides migrant Head Start

services to up to 130 children3 ages 6 weeks to 5 years. CDLF begins by picking up these
children from their homes between 7 and 7:30 each morning, and cares for them until late
afternoon. The children come from between 90 and 100 Hispanic families in the area,
most of whom are migrant agricultural workers. (R. 156, f 3.)
45.

Eligibility for the Head Start program is based on poverty guidelines. For

instance, a family of four must earn less than $18,100 per year to qualify for these
services. CDLF provides the children with day care, early literacy education, art and
music programs, physical programs, health and dental care, and other age appropriate
child development services. It also acts as a social and skills center for the parents, who
typically meet there twice each month to socialize and receive job and other training. (R.
156, f 4.)
46.

When the motion for preliminary injunction was first filed in March 2003,

there was, aside from the Honeyville center, one other Head Start facility serving Northern
Utah and Southern Idaho. The Garland facility was located ten miles from Honeyville, but
CDLF no longer provides Head Start services there.4 The closest Head Start program in
3

This figure represents the number of children served by CDLF at the close of its
seasonal year on March 1, 2003, when the motion for preliminary injunction was initially
filed. Since CDLF resumed migrant Head Start Program services on June 1, 2003, 172
children are enrolled at the Honey ville center.
4

CDLF closed its Garland facility on July 31, 2003. Before it was closed, the
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Utah with any excess capacity is located in Provo, which currently could accommodate
about 20 additional children.

The migrant Head Start programs provide the only

subsidized bilingual day care in Utah. (R. 156, f 5.)
47.

In the event the Honeyville facility is closed, the families being served from

there would be forced to either purchase day care, which is unlikely to provide bilingual
care, or leave their young children in the care of other children while their parents work
in the fields. (R. 157, f 6.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to issue a preliminary injunction
to prevent the Carters from evicting CDLF from the premises. Applying a sliding scale
to the two disputed elements of the Rule 65 A test-L e., irreparable harm and the likelihood
of success on the merits of the underlying claim-the evidence clearly preponderates in
favor of CDLF. CDLF makes a strong and uncontroverted showing of irreparable harm
if the injunction is not issued. It makes an equally strong, although disputed, showing of
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim.

Garland facility served 62 children, all but 20 of who were bused from the Logan area.
The 42 children previously bused from Logan are served by CDLF's new Head Start
facility in Logan. When it opened its doors on August 1,2003, the Logan facility operated
at full capacity of 62 children. The 20 local children previously attending the Garland
center were transferred to the Honeyville facility, which accounts in part for its recent
increased enrollment of 172 children. The Honeyville and Logan facilities remain the only
Head Start Programs in Northern Utah and Southern Idaho.
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CDLF is likely to succeed on the merits because it can show both the existence of
an oral agreement to convey, and that the Statute of Frauds does not bar enforcement of
that agreement. The doctrine of part performance places the oral contract outside the
Statute of Frauds. It is either not necessary to establish the fourth element of the doctrine
(i.e., the improvements made on the land must be exclusively referable to the oral
contract) because there is sufficient evidence independent of the acts of improvement, or
the facts show that the improvements are exclusively referable to the oral contract.
Because there is no dispute the Carters refuse to convey title of the Property, CDLF can
demonstrate a prima facie case of breach of contract. The trial court's refusal to issue
a preliminary injunction should therefore be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING
CDLF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
A.

Rule 65A(e) Injunction Standards.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) sets forth the elements required for a
preliminary injunction to issue:
(1)

The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or
injunction issues;
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(2)

The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or
enjoined;

(3)

The order or injunction, if issues, would not be adverse to the public
interest; and

(4)

There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation.

Hunsaker v. KersK 1999 UT 106, 1 7, 991 P.2d 67 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)).
B.

Marshaling of Evidence

Ordinarily, to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
CDLF, the appellant, would be required to marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thereby making them clearly
erroneous. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy , 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998). This
deferential standard is applied because trial courts occupy "an advantaged position to
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Id.
In this appeal, however, the trial court does not occupy an advantaged position
because it did not hold an evidentiary hearing before denying the motion for preliminary
injunction. The trial court's findings of fact are based on the competing affidavits
submitted by the parties even though there are disputed issues of material fact.
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For instance, while Ms. Thomas of CDLF asserts in her affidavit there was an
enforceable agreement to convey title, Mrs. Carter's affidavit denies this. While
CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, states in his affidavit there was an enforceable agreement
to convey, the affidavit of Mrs. Carter's attorney, Mr. Bell, denies this. Obviously, the
existence of the oral agreement is contested, and the credibility of witnesses is at issue.
It is well established that "a hearing is customarily held and is the preferred
procedure" to decide a motion for preliminary injunction. 42 Am Jur2d Injunctions § 259
at 839 (2000 ed.). "The hearing which is required has been characterized as . . . an
evidentiary hearing. The trial includes a trial of issues of fact, and on the hearing the court
must give the parties the opportunity to present evidence, . . . " 43 A C.J.S. Injunctions
§ 225.a (1978 ed.). This is especially so when a dispute exists as to material facts. See
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 65.21[4] at 65-35 (2003 ed.) (stating a hearing on the

merits is usually required when a dispute exists between parties as to material facts).
Because the trial court did not require live testimony before finding the disputed
facts, and otherwise does not, in relation to this Court, occupy an advantaged position with
respect to the disputed facts presented by the parties, CDLF should not be required to
marshal the evidence on appeal.
C.

Undisputed Injunction Elements

Two of the four elements required for a preliminary injunction to issue were not
disputed by the Carters in the trial court, and were not discussed by the trial court in its
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findings of fact and conclusions of law. It should be presumed, therefore, that CDLF
satisfies these two elements of the four-part test. Briefly:
1.

Injury to CDLF Outweighs Any Damage to The Carters.

The threatened injury to CDLF posed by the Carters' demand to vacate the
premises far outweighs whatever damage an injunctive order may cause the Carters. In
fact, it is difficult to conceive of any damage to the Carters that may be caused by
preserving the status quo in this case. The fact that the Carters have not yet acted to
formally evict CDLF proves this point conclusively.
Pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, CDLF has never paid rent to use the
Property. It has, however, paid all expenses to maintain the Property, including payment
of insurance, taxes and basic repairs. The Carters have never incurred an expense arising
from CDLF's use of the premises. CDLF intends to continue paying these expenses to
maintain the premises during the pendency of this litigation.
2.

Injunction Would Not be Adverse to The Public Interest.

A preliminary injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. On the contrary,
the public interest is furthered by the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case since
some 172 young children of migrant families will continue to receive vital services they
cannot receive anywhere else in Utah or Southern Idaho.
D.

Disputed Injunction Elements
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1.

CDLF Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if a Preliminary Injunction
Does Not Issue.

The purpose of injunctive relief is "preventive in nature. A preliminary injunction
is " v an anticipatory remedy purposed to prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong
or to compel the cessation of a continuing one.'" It further serves to "preserve the status
quo pending the outcome of the case.'" Hunsaker, 991 P.2d at 69 (citations omitted).
Thus, irreparable harm includes "v[w]rongs of a repeated and continuing character, or
which occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate
standard. . . . "Irreparable injury" justifying an injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in
money.'" Id. (quoting System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah
1983)).
"Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is a demonstration of that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer
irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered, . . . " Wright, Miller
& Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil2d: § 2948.1 at 139 (1995 ed.).
In the event the Honeyville facility is closed, CDLF will be unable to administer the
Head Start Program that currently serves 172 young children and some 100 migrant
families. These families cannot obtain comparable child care anywhere else in Utah or
Southern Idaho. CDLF may also lose credibility with its clients, and in the community.
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It will also be unable to preserve the substantial improvements it has made to the Property.
This harm is irreparable and cannot be compensated in money damages.
The trial court, however, found that CDLF did not make a sufficient showing of
irreparable harm, rejecting its evidence as being based "on the speculative fear that the
Migrant Head Start Program could not relocate to another facility and would have to
close." (R. 606, 1f23.)
The sole factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that the 172 children currently
being served by the Honeyville center could be relocated to another facility is Mrs.
Carter's affidavit, and, in particular, an article in the October 7, 2000 edition of the
Deseret News she claims to have read and has attached as an exhibit to her affidavit. (R.
286, f 37.) The article reported that CDLF had closed a Head Start facility in Provo.
With respect to relocating the children previously served by the Provo facility, the article
stated: "The Migrant Head Start center in Salem-which is also overseen by Centro de la
Familia-has accommodated a few children." (R. 308-9.) On the basis of this single
sentence in a newspaper article written nearly three years ago, concerning conditions in
Utah County, the trial court rejected CDLF's affidavit evidence detailing its inability to
relocate the children if eviction is not stayed.
The trial court's singular reliance on the October 2000 article is so lacking as to
be against the clear weight of the evidence submitted by CDLF. Its showing of the
absence in 2003 of alternative facilities in Utah and Southern Idaho is uncontroverted by
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the Carters, and is hardly "speculative." The evidence is concrete: 172 children will be
without Head Start services if the Carters' threatened eviction is not stayed, and 58
employees of the facility (federal and state guidelines impose optimal child-teacher ratios)
will be without work. The lives of these children, their parents and the staff members will
be highly disrupted. Further, the improvements CDLF made to the Property will not be
maintained.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conclude that
CDLF will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction if not issued.
2.

Substantial Likelihood that CDLF will Prevail on The Merits of
The Underlying Claim.

"To meet the requirements of subsection four, an applicant must, at the very least,
make a prima facie showing that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved."
Water & Energy Sys. Tec. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, % 8, 974 P.2d 821 (citing case). In its
First Amended Complaint, CDLF has alleged four causes of action: breach of the contract
to convey, quiet title, unjust enrichment and fraud. The motion for preliminary injunction
is grounded on the claim for breach of oral contract.
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party,
and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C, 2001 UT 20, if 14, 20 P.3d 388.
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Adopting the Carters' arguments, the trial court concluded that CDLF is unlikely
to prevail on the merits of the underlying claim for specific performance of the oral
agreement to convey. In particular, the trial court ruled there was no contract to convey
the Property to CDLF (R. 601, f 5), and if there was an agreement to convey, it is barred
by the Statute of Frauds ( R. 602, f 8.)
The Statute of Frauds invoked by the Carters, Section 25-5-1,

UTAH CODE ANN.

(1953), provides that " [n]o estate or interest in real property, . . ., shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing."
Because it admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by Mrs.
Carter, CDLF relies on the doctrine of part performance to establish the substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying contract claim. The doctrine of part
performance is codified at Section 25-5-8, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953), and states as follows:
Right to specific performance not affected.-Nothing in this chapter contained
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.
See also, Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) ("Ordinarily a verbal gift of
land or an oral agreement to convey land is within the statute of frauds. However, the
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doctrine of part performance allows a court of equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it
has been partially performed.").
(a)

The oral agreement to convey the property to CDLF,

The terms of an oral agreement to convey title of land "must be clear and definite
and established by clear and definite testimony." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79
(Utah 1982) {citing Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975)).
Here, the terms of the agreement to convey were clear and definite: in exchange for
locating a Migrant Head Start Program at the old Honeyville Elementary School, and
investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate the Property, CDLF would receive title of the
Property upon the completion of the improvements.
(i)

Meeting of the minds.

The Carters asserted in the trial court that "none of the facts relied on by CDLF
demonstrate that Mrs. Carter ever expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged
oral contract to convey title to the Property to CDLF. CDLF has no evidence that the
offer was a firm commitment, as opposed to a mere agreement to agree." (R. 193.)
"[Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the
same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978).

The parties'

intent is measured by objective

manifestations, and is a question of fact. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,
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1001 (Utah 1991). The relevant inquiry here is the objective meaning of the parties'
language and conduct.5
The Carters' argument that there was no contract because there was no meeting of
the minds defies the objective meaning of Mrs. Carter's acts.
Mrs. Carters' affidavit, which is the basis for the Carters' opposition to the
existence of an oral agreement to convey, is an assertion of subjective belief. But her
alleged belief that she and her husband remained, until March 2001, subjectively undecided
as to whether they would convey the Property to CDLF, is not controlling. (R. 286, ^
39.) Nor is their alleged indecision as to how, on their tax returns, they would treat the
conveyance to CDLF. These after-the-fact assertions are self-serving, and have the same
legal force or effect as the professed intent of twenty Bishops.

Judge Learned Hand's famous "twenty bishops" analogy in Hotchkiss v.
Nat'I City Bk. Of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), remains the most
eloquent exposition of this principle that a party is bound by the objective meaning of its
acts and may not claim a different subjective intent:
. . . A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words,
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon
them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort.
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Instead, only Mrs. Carter's acts are controlling. This point is reflected in the
description of an offer to make a contract: "the manifestation of willingness to enter into
a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it." Restatement (Second) Contracts § 24 (1981 ed.).
The affidavits CDLF has submitted show that the Carters' manifestations would
have led a reasonable person to believe-and certainly led CDLF and numerous newspaper
reporters and others to believe-that an offer to convey title of the Property to CDLF had
been made. There is no other explanation for CDLF's expenditure of more than
$680,000 to improve the Property to locate a Head Start Program there. CDLF did not,
as the Carters contend, knowingly spend $680,000 to improve the Property for the right
to occupy it for only four months. (CDLF began folly occupying the premises on June 1,
2002, and the lease agreement expired on October 1, 2000.) Such a transaction makes no
sense because that was not the parties' agreement.
The parties agreed that, in exchange for locating a Migrant Head Start Program at
the old Honeyville Elementary School, and investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate
the Property, CDLF would receive title of the Property. Objective, independent evidence
showing the existence of this contract is ubiquitous.
When Mrs. Carter first contacted Tom Hogan of CDLF, she voiced her intention
to purchase the Property and convey it to CDLF. (R. 462, f f

4-6.) In one form or

another, she repeated this statement in every subsequent conversation she had with Ms.
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Thomas, and with third parties such as the Box Elder School District Board and newspaper
reporters.
The parties' conduct also manifested a mutual understanding that the Carters had
agreed to convey the Property to CDLF. Mrs. Carter met with Ms. Thomas in June 2000
to arrange the conveyance; the Carters met with Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hansen in July 2000
for the same purpose; Mrs. Carter, Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hogan attended a School District
Board meeting later in July 2000 to consider the Carter's offer to purchase the Property;
and the Carters actually purchased the Property in late September. Ms. Thomas attended
the closing on the Property.
At that point, it was widely reported in local newspapers that the Carters would be
conveying the Property to CDLF. For instance, the Standard-Examiner reported that
Mrs. Carter "has promised her school to Centro de la Familia, a Hispanic advocacy
group, for its migrant Head Start program in southern Box Elder County." (R. 117;
Appendix C hereto.) "The Carters and Centro de la Familia are still working out when
the building will switch hands, but Bonnie Carter said she'd like to see the group in the
building as soon as possible." Another local newspaper, the Box Elder News Journal,
shows a picture of Mrs. Carter shaking hands with Mr. Frandsen, and includes a caption
stating: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and plan on turning the
property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start program." ( R.
118; Appendix D hereto.)
33

A few days later, Ms. Thomas reported the terms of the agreement to CDLF's
Board of Directors. The Minutes of the September 29, 2000 Board meeting state, in
relevant part: "Honeyville has been signed and bought by the Carters. We will enter into
a rental agreement with the Carters. They will donate the monthly rent until they pass title
to CDLF in a few months." (R. 477; Appendix E hereto.) Two weeks later, on October
16, 2000, and well before the lease agreement was signed in December 2000, the
construction process began when Ms. Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for Architect"
letters. (R. 470-1; f 18.) The improvements took about one and one-half years to
complete. During that period, Ms. Thomas spoke to Mrs. Carter every four to six weeks
about the progress of the rehabilitation project, and always took pains to thank Mrs. Carter
for her and her husband's promise to convey. At no time before the completion of the
improvements in the Spring of 2002 did Mrs. Carter during any of these conversations
with Ms. Thomas ever say that the conveyance would not occur. (R. 471, 1 24.)
Additionally, CDLF's 2000 Annual Report was mailed to the Carters in September
2001 (R. 471-2, if 25) -that is, mid-way through the completion of the improvements, and
long after the March 2001 letter was sent. Next to a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Carter, the
caption reads:
Centro de la Familia de Utah would like to express our utmost appreciation
to David & Bonnie Carter for their exceptional vision and foresight. Thenvery generous donation of the Honeyville School in Northern Utah will allow
us to serve an expanding population of migrant families in the Northern Utah
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area and perpetuates the legacy of a building built to serve the community's
educational needs.
(R. 547; Appendix H hereto.) The Carters never objected to this description of their
commitment to CDLF. (R. 472, f 25.)
With the knowledge and cooperation of the Carters' attorney, CDLF's attorney
began in May 2001 to obtain an appraisal of the Property for the purpose of collateralizing
it after the impending conveyance. (R. 442, f 11.) Mr. Hansen took these steps because
he and his client understood that CDLF would become the owner of the Property upon the
completion of the improvements, and they wanted to leverage the equity created by those
improvements to facilitate the purchase of a new administrative center in Salt Lake City.
The Carters' attorney was fully informed of CDLF' s efforts to collateralize the Property,
and he never communicated any objection to CDLF's understanding that it would become
the owner of the Property. (R. 442, f 12.)
The foregoing facts are largely undisputed, and provide overwhelming proof of the
existence of the agreement to convey. The facts show that the parties had a clear and
definite agreement to convey the Property in exchange for improving it and locating a
migrant Head Start Program there. Mrs. Carters' statements to third persons, conduct,
and her and her attorney's silence in the face of CDLF's reliance, altogether show a
meeting of the minds on the material terms of the agreement to convey.
(ii)

Consideration.
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The Carters argued in the trial court that there was no enforceable agreement to
convey because there was no mutual consideration before Mrs. Carter sent the letter of
March 23,2001. In particular, they argued that until CDLF began constructing the actual,
physical improvements, it had provided no consideration for the promise to convey.
(Transcript at 13, Exhibit J hereto.)
This argument rests on a faulty assumption; namely, it assumes there was no mutual
consideration binding the executory contract before Mrs. Carter sent her letter of March
23, 2001. Because it assumes there was no mutual consideration before then, it also
assumes, again incorrectly, that Mrs. Carters' letter could revoke the promise to convey.
In addition to verbal and written means, CDLF manifested its acceptance of the
Carters' offer when it changed its position in June 2000. Relying on Mrs. Carters'
representations that she would convey title of the Property, CDLF withdrew from
attempting to purchase the Property. See Restatement (Second) Contracts §71(1981ed.)
(providing that performance constituting consideration includes forbearance). The Carters
ultimately purchased the Property for $72,500, which CDLF could easily have paid using
a portion of the approximately $600,000 it had on hand to locate a suitable property. (R.
467,1f3.)
CDLF further changed its position on or about October 16, 2000, when Ms.
Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for Architect" letters. (R. 470-1, 1 18.) This
additional change in position occurred before the lease agreement was signed in December
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2000, (R. 285, f 30), and at about the same time the Carters' attorney delivered his
initial draft of the lease agreement that was ultimately signed by the parties (R. 324, f 6).
As of March 14, 2001, CDLF had paid the retained architect $13,320 for services
rendered in preparing the design plans for the improvements. (R. 471, f 20.) These
expenses were paid before Mrs. Carter sent her letter of March 23, 2000.
The fact that on-site construction did not begin until May 2001 is not controlling.
Indeed, in the trial court the Carters did not cite to any case holding that reliance under
these circumstances must take the form of on-site work as distinguished from architect or
other preparatory work. CDLF's change of position is instead controlling. The evidence
of CDLF's acts, including the expenditure of at least $13,320, before Mrs. Carter's
letter was sent is uncontroverted. These acts manifested CDLF's acceptance that was
invited by the Carters' offer. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 50 (1981 ed.)
(providing for acceptance by performance).
Thus, CDLF did not respond to the March 23 letter because an enforceable
agreement to convey existed well before it was received. CDLF treated the letter as an
offer to modify the existing agreement. CDLF's silence in response to the letter operated
as a rejection of the offer to modify. The offer, therefore, never had any legal force or
effect. See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 72 (1963 ed.).
To summarize this section, the terms of the agreement to convey were clear and
definite, and will be established at trial by clear and definite testimony: in exchange for
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locating a Migrant Head Start Program at the old Honeyville Elementary School, and
investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate the Property, CDLF would receive title of the
Property. The ubiquitous, objective evidence showing the terms of the agreement is
largely undisputed by the Carters, who offer only Mrs. Carters' purported subjective
belief that she considered entering into an agreement to convey title, but remained
undecided until March 2001, which she finally decided to offer only a lease in perpetuity.
(R. 286, f 39.)
Moreover, there was mutual consideration for the promise to convey. CDLF
changed its position in June 2000 in reliance on the Carters' representations, and again
in October 2000. The Carters paid only $72,500 for the surplus property, and CDLF
could have purchased it as well using the grant funds it had programmed for just that
purpose. It withdrew from purchasing the Property because the Carters had led CDLF to
believe that they would instead purchase the Property and convey it. No later than October
16, 2000, or immediately after the Carters closed on the sale of the Property, CDLF began
the process of rehabilitating the Property. These improvements were completed in the
Spring of 2002, at a cost of more than $680,000. Through the rehabilitated Property,
CDLF began providing Migrant Head Start services on June 1, 2002, thereby performing
all its obligations under the oral agreement with the Carters.
(b)

The doctrine of part performance.
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While the Statute of Frauds bars the enforcement of an oral contract to convey an
interest in land, the doctrine of part performance removes that bar. Ravarino v. Price, 260
P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 1953). The purpose of the doctrine is the prevention of fraud and
injustice:
The doctrine of part performance, in the state of Utah, has not been
reduced to a formula, as it has in some of our sister states. Thus, decisions
of this court do not stay the hand of equity in the equitable situations created
by oral contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, but the statute is
preserved and remains to serve its purpose-the prevention of fraud and
injustice.
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980) {quoting Holmgren Bros, v. Ballard, 534 P.2d
611, 613-14 (1975)). It is grounded in principles of equity.See Coleman v. Dillman, 624
P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981); Hargreaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262, 266 (Utah 1922).
Four elements are used to measure the sufficiency of the acts of part performance:
"(1) any improvements made on the property must be substantial and valuable; (2)
valuable consideration must be given; (3) possession must be actual and open; and (4) the
acts of performance must be exclusively referable to the contract." Bradshaw v. McBridq
649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982).
The improvements made to the Property clearly meet the first element. CDLF
expended more than $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with Head Start
Program requirements.

Its contractor tore down walls, constructed pony walls,

reconfigured bathrooms and classrooms for younger children, installed smaller, age-
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appropriate playgrounds, installed fences, and generally reconfigured the premises from
solely an educational center for school age children to a social services and educational
center for babies, toddlers and pre-schoolers. (R. 470, % 17.)
These were not improvements that would have been made by a tenant in the
ordinary use of the premises, but were instead substantial and permanently valuable to the
land. (The March 2002 appraisal found that with the improvements the Property had an
appraised value of about $375,000 over the $72,500 the Carters paid to purchase it.) They
also far exceeded the (inflated) free rent amount the lease agreement allowed the Carters
to claim as a charitable tax donation. Over the term of the lease agreement, that amount
of $5,000 per month aggregated to a total of $120,000, as distinguished from the more
than $680,000 that CDLF expended. (R. 471, H 22.) See Ryan, 618 P.2d at 56 (enforcing
oral contract for sale of land, and identifying as significant the fact that improvements on
property far exceeded rental value and that needed for ordinary use by tenant).
With respect to the second element of the test, CDLF has shown that it gave
valuable consideration to the Carters; namely, it gave forbearance from purchasing the
Property itself, and agreed to rehabilitate the old Honey ville Elementary School, which
Mrs. Carter had attended as a child, to locate a Migrant Head Start Program there, and to
prevent the destruction of the building.
Satisfying the third element of the test, CDLF took possession of the Property soon
after it was purchased by the Carters in September 2000, and began continuously
40

occupying it on June 1, 2002. (R. 471, f 23.) This possession of the Property was open
and known to the Carters and not without their consent.
The Carters contend, and the trial court concluded, only that CDLF cannot satisfy
the fourth element, namely, that the acts of performance (i.e., the improvements worth
$680,000) were exclusively referable to the oral agreement to convey the Property to
CDLF. (R. 603, f 12.) They argue that the improvements are instead referable to the
lease agreement, and, in particular, two clauses within Paragraph 6 of that agreement.
The Carters' argument fails, however, because the oral agreement to convey is
established by evidence independent of the acts of part performance; and because, in fact,
the improvements are not referable to the lease agreement.
(i)

Evidence of the oral agreement to convey
independent of the improvements.

The element of exclusive referability is " van evidentiary requirement of equity that
the facts speak for themselves.'" Martin, 678 P.2d at 278 (quoting "The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah," 9 Utah Law Review 91, 105
(1971)). "As a corollary, where either independent acts which prove the contract can be
found, or an admission of the contract is present, the requirement of exclusive referability
may be relaxed because the evidentiary concern is assuaged by either the admission or the
independent acts." Id. See also, In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1954)
(stating: "[w]here existence of the oral contract is established by . . . evidence
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independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part
performance must be exclusively] referable to the oral contract is satisfied.. . .").
To be sure, the above discussion showing the existence of the oral agreement to
convey relies on proof of the improvements, but it also includes substantial evidence
independent of the acts of improvement. This independent evidence, most of which is
uncontroverted, establishes the existence of the oral agreement, thereby satisfying the
requirement of exclusive referability.
In the first instance, there are the Carters' statements to CDLF, newspaper
reporters and the Box Elder School District Board of their intent to convey the Property
to CDLF. In her first contact with a CDLF representative, Mrs. Carter told Mr. Hogan:
"we're

going to get you this building," or words to that affect.

(R. 462, f 6.)

Similarly, in her first meeting with Ms. Thomas, Mrs. Carter said: "Since the [Box Elder]
School District won't give it [the school] to you, I will." (R. 467, % 4.) During June
and July of 2000, Ms. Carter told CDLF that she and her husband intended to purchase
the Property in August and convey it to CDLF. (R. 469, f 10.)
At the School District Board meeting on September 27, 2000, Mr. Frandsen
reported that the Carters "intended to gift the Property to CDLF for use in its Migrant
Head Start Program." (R. 365, 1 13.) The School District Board's Minutes stated:
"Mr. And Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City have offered to purchase the property for
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a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift the property in turn to Centro de la Familia
de Utah for use in their program." (R. 381; Appendix B hereto.)
The Minutes of Ms. Thomas' September 2000 report to CDLF's Board of
Directors concerning the status of the transaction state: "Honeyville has been signed and
bought by the Carters. We will enter into a rental agreement with the Carters. They will
donate the monthly rent until they pass title to CDLF in a few months." (R. 477;
Appendix E hereto.)
A few days later, the Standard-Examiner reported that Mrs. Carter "has promised
her school to Centro de la Familia, a Hispanic advocacy group, for its migrant Head Start
program in southern Box Elder County." (R. 117; Appendix C hereto.) The Box Elder
News Journal also reported: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and
plan on turning the property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start
program." (R. 118; Appendix D hereto.)
CDLF's 2000 Annual Report thanked the Carters for "[t]heir very generous
donation of the Honeyville School in Northern Utah will allow us to serve an expanding
population of migrant families in the Northern Utah area and perpetuates the legacy of a
building built to serve the community's educational needs." (R. 547; Appendix H
hereto.) The Carters never objected to this description of their commitment. (R. 472,1f
25.)
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Finally, in the last conversation between Ms. Thomas and Mrs. Carter, in March
2002, Ms. Thomas asked Mrs. Carter when CDLF could expect to receive title to the
Property. Mrs. Carter responded, for the first time ever, that she and her husband had
decided not to convey the Property to CDLF. Rather than deny the existence of an
agreement to convey, Mrs. Carter gave as her reason: "We don't agree with your
mortgaging the building." (R. 472, f 26.)
The foregoing evidence is independent of the improvements. At a minimum, this
evidences realxes the exclusive referability requirement, but more likely satisfies it. See
In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d at 281.
(ii)

The improvements are not referable to the lease
agreement.

Turning to an analysis of the lease agreement, CDLF's acts of part performance,
the improvements, cannot be referable to that agreement because they began before the
agreement was signed. The first overt step CDLF took to improve the Property was to
issue "Request for Proposal for Architect" letters on or about October 16, 2000. (R. 470,
% 18.) Once begun, this undertaking continued until the improvements were completed
in the Spring of 2002. At about the same time the architect letters were sent, Mr. Bell sent
Mr. Hansen an initial draft of the lease agreement. (R. 324, if 6.) However, the final
lease agreement was not signed by Mrs. Carter until December 2000. (R. 285,1 30.)
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The acts of improvement are also not referable to the lease agreement because it had
a term of only two years (i.e., October 1,2000 to October 1,2002). (R. 290,1 2.) The
parties, through their attorneys, chose this duration because it was anticipated the
substantial improvements (including compliance with federal government contracting
procedures) would take about one to one and one-half years to complete. (R. 131-2, f
7.) In fact, the improvements were completed, and CDLF began providing Head Start
Program services at the Honeyville center, on June 1, 2002 (R. 471, f 23); that is, 20
months after the effective date of the lease agreement.
Nor does the Carters' contention that the parties memorialized their arrangement
through the lease agreement make any practical sense. The Carters contend that CDLF
agreed, through the lease agreement, to expend $680,000 to rehabilitate the Property in
exchange for the right to occupy the premises for only four months, with the added
requirement that CDLF agreed to vacate the premises as of October 1, 2002, which is the
middle of the school year. (Migrant Head Start services are provided in Utah from June
1 to March 1 of the following year, generally reflecting the farm growing and harvesting
seasons.) The illogic of such an arrangement implies the parties never intended the
improvements to be referable to the lease agreement. See Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d
1035, 1039 (Utah 1975) (enforcing oral agreement to convey, and reasoning that "the
facts of this case would be inconsistent with any other conclusion than that the parties had
a definite understanding, which equity will specifically enforce.").
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Further, nowhere does the lease agreement state that the substantial improvements
are referable to it. The lease agreement makes explicit reference to the consideration given
by CDLF in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent-free. That consideration
does not refer to CDLF's substantial improvements, but rather limited maintenance. The
page one recital states: "In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which
is the subject of this lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and
agreements of the parties hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:". (R. 290.)
Certainly it is reasonable to assume that if, as the Carters contend, CDLF had
promised to expend $680,000 to improve the Property in exchange for a two year lease,
then this recital would have made some form of reference to that arrangement.
The "covenant to maintain the property" is found in Paragraph 6, which is entitled
"Repair and Care of Building by Tenant". Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
(10th ed.) defines the word "repair" as follows: "to restore by replacing a part or putting
together what is torn or broken." A synonym for care is maintenance, which is defined
as follows: "the upkeep of property or equipment." Obviously, neither the words
"repair" nor "care of building "contemplate a material alteration of the premises. Indeed,
the language used in Paragraph 6 proves this point conclusively. Of the two clauses within
Paragraph 6 that are relied upon by the Carters, the first states:
Tenant may at its own cost and expense, and in a good and workmanlike
manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the
conduct of the business without, however, materially altering the basic
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character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure of the
Premises.
(R. 98-9; Exhibit F hereto.) By its plain terms, this clause only authorized CDLF to make
non-material alterations in the character of the building or existing improvements.
Because this clause did not cover material alterations in the character of the building
or existing improvements, it did not cover the improvements that CDLF made to the
Property, most or all of which were material alterations. And because this clause did not
cover the improvements that CDLF made to the Property, those improvements were not
referable to Paragraph 6.
CDLF' s improvements of the Property were not designed to maintain the premises,
but rather to alter the character of the school building and prior existing improvements
therein. The Carters purchased the building for only $72,500, while CDLF had to expend
an additional $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with Head Start Program
requirements. The Property had been operated as an elementary school serving children
ages kindergarten through sixth grade. By contrast, the Head Start Program to be located
at the old Honeyville Elementary School would serve children ages two months through
five years of age. And unlike a public elementary school, the Head Start Program also
provides daycare, health and nutrition services, as well as educational programs to the
children. (R. 156, f 4.) To provide these additional services, CDLF altered the premises
as described above in Section I.D.2(b), page 40.
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The Carters also rely on a second clause within Paragraph 6: "Any alterations or
improvements to the Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration
or sooner termination of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided." This clause
should not be construed out of context, as the Carters would have it. Rather, this clause
must be read in conjunction with the other terms and purpose of Paragraph 6.
Pursuant to Paragraph 6, the lease agreement authorized CDLF to make only nonmaterial alterations to the premises. Since CDLF' s improvements in fact materially
altered the premises, those improvements fell outside the coverage of the second clause of
paragraph 6, and therefore of the lease agreement. The second clause of Paragraph 6 must
be construed to mean the basic maintenance that is authorized under Paragraph 6 becomes
the property of the landlord.
As noted above, the lease agreement makes no explicit reference to CDLF's
improvements. This is also notable because Paragraph 6 employs the most common sort
of boilerplate language found in all commercial lease agreements. The Carters' attorney
delivered an initial draft of the proposed language that he said he had used in the past. (R.
440, f 4.) The two subject clauses of Paragraph 6 passed straight through to the final
draft, substantively unchanged. (R. 441, t 6.) The boilerplate language of Paragraph 6,
therefore, contrasts sharply with the extraordinary transaction proffered by the Carters;
namely, CDLF agreed to rehabilitate the Property in exchange for the right to occupy it
for only four months.
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The Carters' s contention that the improvements are referable to the lease agreement
cannot, therefore, be squared with its language or the parties' circumstances. The
language and circumstances show that the lease agreement was signed at the request of the
Carters as a stop gap measure intended to formalize CDLF's commitment to pay property
taxes and insurance and to maintain the Property during the completion of the
improvements, and to enable the Carters to claim a charitable tax deduction of $5,000 per
month (the rent-free amount provided for in the lease agreement).
The facts in this case place it squarely within the prior decisions of this Court
enforcing an oral agreement to convey an interest in land. See Ryan, 618 P.2d 54 (finding
sufficient improvements of $15,000 to $20,000 to the existing cinderblock building,
fences, ditches, etc., and expenditure of $80,000 to construct new home on the property);
Woolsey, 539 P.2d 1035 (increase of plaintiff s monthly payment from $70 to $81, which
was the mortgage amount, and willingness to pay all of mortgage, found sufficient to
enforce oral agreement); Hogan v. Swayze, 237 P. 1097 (Utah 1925) (possession and
improvements of cultivation and clearing of land, repair of log house, barn, blacksmith
shop and fencing found sufficient);

Van Natta v. Hey wood, 195 P. 192 (Utah 1920)

(service to decedent found sufficient).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conclude that
CDLF has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim
for breach of oral contract. An agreement to convey title of the Property to CDLF existed.
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Because the significant improvements CDLF made to the Property are not referable to the
lease agreement, the doctrine of part performance is satisfied, and the Statute of Frauds
does not bar enforcement of the contract. The Carter's refusal to convey title of the
Property to CDLF is a breach of that agreement.
Finally, the interplay between the irreparable harm and likelihood of success prongs
of the Rule 65A test has been described as a "sliding scale." Wright, Miller & Kane,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

Civil 2d § 2948.1 at 139 (1995 ed.) (citing cases).

In other words, the greater the showing of probable harm that may result if an injunction
is refused, the lesser is the showing required of a likelihood of success on the merits of the
underlying claim.

With this principle in mind, CDLF has made a strong and

uncontroverted showing of irreparable harm, and an equally, although admittedly more
disputed, showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Applying a sliding scale, any
question concerning the latter showing is more than compensated by the former showing,
and when coupled these showings preponderate over the Carters'

opposition.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant injunctive relief
to stay the status quo.
CONCLUSION
CDLF respectfully requests that the trial court's denial of the motion for
preliminary injunction be reversed, and the matter be remanded for further proceedings
on the merits.
50

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2003.
BUCKLAND ORTON, LLC
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David J. Burns
Scott W. Hansen
Attorneys for Appellant
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CENTRO DE LA FAMILIA DE UTAH
Westgate Business Center
320 West 200 South Suite 300-B, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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June 9, 2000
Bonita Carter
29 Lone Hollow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092

Dear Ms, Carter:
Please allow me to express my sincerest thanks for yesterday's meeting. It was a
pleasure getting to know you and to hear of your extremely generous proposal. Frankly,
I am overwhelmed. It is by far the largest gift our agency has ever been offered. Words
fail me when I think about the long-term blessing this building donation would be to our
families, the children we serve and community of Honeyville.
I know there are many details to work out, but I earnestly hope this donation can go
forward. I look forward to our further meetings and feel free to call me at any time if
you have questions or concerns.
Very truly yours,

Graciela Itahano-Thomas
Chief Executive Officer

Strengthening the Hispanic Family by Promoting Seif-Sufficiency
Supported by Salt Lake County Division of Substance Abuse Services
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TENTATIVE MINUTES OF A REGULAR MEETING
OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Tentative minutes of a Regufar Meeting of the Board of Education, Box Elder County
School District, held Wednesday evening, September 2Z, 2000 at 6:30 p.m. at the District
Office.
Those in attendance at the meeting included Board President Teresa N. Garrett, Board
Members Jerry W. Buchanan, Thomas E. Purdue, Kelly Nelson, and Student Board Member
Ashley Vance. Also present were Superintendent Martell Menlove, Administrative Assistants,
Ronald L. Frandsen, Dr. Jay C. Stuart, and Mary Kay Kirkland, representatives of the Box
Elder Education Association, district employees, members of the press and interested
citizens. Vice President Siddoway was excused.
After the prayer, which was offered by Superintendent Menlove, Ronald Frandsen led
the audience in the pledge of allegiance to the flag.
President Garrett acknowledged the artwork provided by the students of Young
Intermediate School then welcomed those in attendance and conducted the business of the
meeting.
Ryan Morley, Box Elder High School Student Body President and Keely Hill, Head
Cheerleader, were present and invited Board members to attend the Homecoming activities
that are taking place this week at Box Elder High School. President Garrett thanked them and
wished them well in their activities.
ACTJON ITEMS
2001-2002 School Calendar
Superintendent Menlove presented a tentative calendar for the 2001-2002 school year.
This proposed calendar has been circulated among the employees for their comment. No
negative comments have been received at this time. He noted that the UEA break is in
September on this calendar rather than October, as in the past. This calendar also covers the
period of time that the Olympics are being held in Salt Lake City. No accommodation has
been made for the Olympics in this calendar.
Member Buchanan moved to adopt the tentative calendar. Member Purdue seconded
the motion, which passed unanimously.
President Garrett raised a question about having the District Inservice day during the
County Fair. Dr. Stuart offered to take this to the Career Ladder Committee.

Tentative Minutes

September 27, 2000

Sale of Honewille School Property
Mr. Frandsen reported that the negotiations on the sale of Honeyville School property
are now finalized. Mr. and Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City have offered to purchase the
property for a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift the property in turn to Centra de la
Familia de Utah for use in their program. The District will give a Quit Claim Deed for the south
1.5 acres, which has a clouded title, and a Warranty Deed for the north 1.5 acres, for which
the District has clear title.
Member Nelson moved to accept the terms of sale as described and to authorize Mr.
Frandsen to act as agent for the district and sign the appropriate documents at closing.
MemfreTBuQTanan^
President Garrett thanked Mr. Frandsen for his good work on these negotiations, noting
that we have come a long way since the*o«My-0ffe*-a*ter public notice was $5;000. Mr.
Frandsen expressed his appreciation to Member Buchanan for his advise and counsel during
the negotiations. He also thanked Mrs. Carter for the cordial spirit of the negotiations.
INFORMATION ITEMS
Monthly Financial Report
Mr. Frandsen informed the Board that the Financial Report is in accordance with
expectations in all respects. It is early in the year and expenditures for supplies are
proportionately high which is to be expected.
CONSENT CALENDAR
Member Buchanan moved to accept the consent items. The motion was seconded by
Member Purdue and passed on a unanimous vote. The Consent Calendar included the
following items:
•

Approval of the minutes of the meeting of September 13, 2000.

•

Approval of claims numbered 16191 -16487.

•

Approval for Leave of Absence for Judy Bowcutt and Kresta Burbank.

CLOSED SESSION
Superintendent Menlove informed the Board of the need for a Closed Session to
discuss a personnel matter. At 7: 55 p.m. Member Nelson moved to retire to a Closed
Session to discuss the character and competence of individuals. Member Buchanan
seconded the motion and it passed on a unanimous vote.
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Centro de la Familia de Utah
Board of Directors
Meeting Minutes
Administrative Offices Conference Room
Friday September, 29,2000

Board Members Present: Jesse Soriano, Paulette Jacobson, J. Dee Carlson, Denise Moravec and
Marti Jones.
Excused: Darline Robles, Linda Oda.
Absent: None
Meeting called to order 12:00 p.m.

Jesse Soriano, Board President

Approval of Agenda
Motion by: Marti Jones
Seconded by: Paulette Jacobson
Motion Carried
Approval of Minutes
Motion by: Marti Jones
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson
Name correction: Olene Walker
Motion Carried
Board President Report:
•

•
•
•
•

Jesse Soriano, Board President

Board President and Vice President's visit to the Provo Center after a phone conversation
with Alma Espinoza,
Visit to the Provo Center: Concerns about the physical environment and facilities at the
Provo Center. The interior of the building is dark, not cheery. There was no vitality or
energy on the part of staff. The facility and staffing are not conducive to a quality program
for a child development center.
Recommendations: The Board President, Jesse Soriano recommends to close the Provo
Center based on observations and the resultsfromthe self-assessment assisted by outside
consultants, which show concerns about the facility and the staff as well.
Discussion about the impact on MHSP families by closing the Provo Center.
Parents will be notified in advance to give them time to make the transition. There are other
Head Starts in the area.
Our staff will assist with transition.
In November a Community Needs Assessment will be conducted to locate mobile migrants in
the State.

Motion to close the Provo Center within one week.
Motion by: Denise Moravec
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson

Motion Carried
Motion will be reported at the Policy Council (PC) meeting tomorrow. If agreed by the PC,
-parents will be notified on Monday.
Results from the investigation on Management and Parent Issues at the Provo Center,
Copy of summary shared with board members and discussed.
Motion to accept report as is written with results of the investigation.
Discussion on board accepting findings and practices but leaving actions concerning employment
and Policy Council President to be taken by the Policy Council (PC).
Changes in wording in item 2. Alma Espinoza: She misrepresented and on item 3: Christina
Romero will be reassigned.
Motion by: Denise Moravec
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson
Motion carried after deliberation.
Results of MHSP Self Assessment
Paulette Jacobson, Vice President
• An in house team was assisted by consultants from Clear Vision Consulting. The instrument
used was the I-99+. Every one was given specific questions to answer. Documentation was
reviewed. The results show concerns about the Provo center's facilities and staff. They found
areas that need improvement. Recommendations were made and have been shared with
management.
PC Representative Report
Denise Moravec
• All centers are currently open.
• A Code of Conduct will be included in the PC Bylaws.
Chief Executive Report:

Graciela Italiano-Thornas, CEO

Changes to Accounting Manual
• Recommendations form the self-assessment: Title changefromFinance Director to Financial
Services Manager and there is no longer an accounting manager. In Section F, the Decision of
unallowable cost paragraph added to F2. There are two additional pages listing unallowable
costs. F-3 has been revised for the Purchase Order system. PO process explained to the
board. On August 12 the PC approved changes.
• Typo on Purchase Order (PO): vendors, not venders.
Motion to accept changes on Accounting Manual
Motion by: Paulette Jacobson
Seconded by: Marti Jones
Motion Carried
Dates and Times for Federal Review
• The Federal Review will take place October 23-27,2000. Copy of the tentative schedule
shared with the Board.
• Brief discussion of Federal Review.
Centro Cfvico Project
• Board of directors from Centro Civico and Centro de la Famiha will meet on November 2nd.

Other Business:
• On September 14, Graciela and Rebecca visited the MHSP centers with Lieutenant Governor,
Olene Walker and Janet Bennett, staff from Senator Bennett's office. The visit impressed the
guests. Great public relations,
• Changes to Employment Requirements:
A paragraph will be included stating that Head Start parents have hiring preference if they
meet employment requirements. This simply states in writing what is now current practice.
Motion by: Marti Jones
Seconded by: Denise Moravec
Motion carried

Motion to close today's meeting by:
Marti Jones
Seconded by:
Paulette Jacobson
Motion Carried
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LEASE AGREEMENT

TfflS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this )*&- day of
October, 2000 (the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company ("Landlord"), and Centro de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation
("Tenant").
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of
this Lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Leased Premises. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant, the

premises described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements located
thereon, and all of Landlord'srights,if any, in and to the premises described on Exhibit "B" with
each of said premises being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the "Premises") for the
term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties herein set forth. Said Premises
includes improvements thereto.
2.

Term. The term of this Lease shall be two years and shall commence on

the Effective Date and, unless terminated or extended, shall end on the [ ^

day of October,

2002.
3.

Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not required

to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holds-over after the
term of this Lease, or after Landlord validly terminates this lease early, as a result of Tenant's
1

breach, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such hold-over period at the rate of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) per month.
4.

Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premises only for lawful purposes.

Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal laws, restrictions and
statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances.
5.

Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be kept,

used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premises, any article or material which is prohibited
by law, or which would render any fire or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to
the Premises void or voidable. Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any
such prohibited material that are present as of the date hereof.
Tenant shall not use the Premises in any manner that will constitute waste,
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of loudspeakers or
sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the Premises) to occupants of adjacent
properties.
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premises that will cause damage to the
Premises, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
6.

Repair and Care of Building by Tenant. Tenant has inspected the

Premises and accepts the Premises AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the current sewer
which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a portion of the Premises. Tenant
will not commit any waste of the Premise, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premise in
violation of any present or future law of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation
2

Damage to the Premises caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and
paid for by Tenant.
8.

Glass, Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken ox damaged during the

term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged.
9.

Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat, gas,

sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premises, including
deposits.
10.

Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its best efforts

to obtain an exceptionfromthe payment of property taxes based upon Tenant's charitable use of
the property. To the extent Tenant is unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely
pay the general real property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental
to the conduct of Tenant's business on the Premises during the term of this Lease, including
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premises; provided, however, that Tenant
may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing sufficient surety for
the payment thereof. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all notices of the general real
property tax on the Premises. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give Landlord proof of
exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for payment Taxes for the first
calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated between the parties as of the date Tenant
obtains possession of the Premises and taxes for the last year shall be prorated to and including
the date Tenant quits possession of the Premises. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building
permits) required as a result of its improvements to the Premises. Special assessments imposed
by any governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that enhance,
4

or purport to enhance, the value of the Premises shall be paid between Landlord and Tenant on
such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering the remaining period of Tenant's
Lease and the useful life of the improvement in question. The reasonable, useful life, for
example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty (20) years.
11.

Right of Entry by Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or

representatives shall have therightto enter the Premises at all reasonable times during regular
business hours for any of the following purposes:
(a) To determine whether the Premises are in good condition and whether
Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease;
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an emergency, in
which case no notice shall be required), any necessary maintenance including janitorial
services and to make any restoration to the Premises or the building and other
improvements in which the Premises are located that Landlord has therightto perform;
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed under
the provisions of this Lease;
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60) days of
the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while Tenant is in default;
and
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to prospective
brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest in an exchange or
purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this Lease or any extension
thereof.
5

Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience, disturbance,
loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's entry on the Premises as
provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or permitted onto the Premises by Landlord
or its agents). The above to the contrary notwithstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during
such inspections in a reasonable businesslike manner and shall be liable for physical injury or
damage resultingfromthe negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized
representatives. Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of
its entry on the Premises, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder.
12.

Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest herein

may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law, and neither all
nor any part of the Premises shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of longer than 30 days
without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may withhold its consent on any
basis it, mayfromtime to time, determine. In the event Landlord withholds consent to sublet
the Premises, Landlord shall be obligated to immediately terminate the Lease with Tenant
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Any such assignment or sublease without Landlord's
prior permission shall be void and unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease.
13.

Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premises (or any

portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed, Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date
of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to repair
such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall promptly repair the same; or (ii)
notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to immediately terminate this Lease, in which
event this Lease shall be so terminated effective as of the date of such damage or destruction.
6

In the event notice of condemnation by any governmental authority of the
Premises or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to conduct its
business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall terminate as of the date of
occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds and awards of condemnation, whether
received pursuant to agreement between Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of
any court, shall be exclusively paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the solerightto
negotiate and conclude a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in
Landlord's sole discretion.
14.

Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold

harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from the Tenant's
use of the Premises during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against the
Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the
Premisesfromany cause whatsoever, except such as might resultfromthe negligence of the
Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in writing by
the Tenant requiring such performance by the Landlord.
Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and all
claims of any kind or nature arisingfrom(i) any use or occupancy of the Premises, by the Tenant
or an approved sublessee after the Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform
as herein provided, (iii) any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees,
invitees or licensees, and (iv) for all claims arisingfromviolations of environmental and
hazardous waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after
the Effective Date and as a result of Tenant's use or misuse of the Premises.
7

15.

Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times

during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to do business
in the state in which the Premises is located, comprehensive public liability insurance in the
names of and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their interests appear, with limits not
less than:
Bodily Injury

$ 500,000 per person
$1,000,000 per occurrence

Property Damage

$ 1,000,000 per occurrence

Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket coverage
of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the expiration
of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a satisfactory certificate of the
insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment of premium, shall be deposited with
Landlord within a reasonable time of Landlord's request.
16.

Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance on the

Premises in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable value, which
insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all premiums on such fire
insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent obtainable, provide that any
loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of any mortgage, as their respective
interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise
result in forfeiture of such insurance. Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such
insurance policy being in place, and the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least
thirty (30) days prior notice of termination.
8

17.

Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up the

Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or sooner
termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as altered pursuant
to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the elements excepted. Prior
to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed by Tenant, and repair all damages
caused or incurred as a result of such removal.
18.

Quiet Enjoyment. If Tenant performs and observes all the covenants and

provisions hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premises, subject, however, to whatever
rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the Premises described on Exhibit "B", hereto
19.

Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the exercise

of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such arightor remedy
or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including, without limitation, the
acceptance of the keys to the Premises, shall constitute an acceptance of the surrender of the
Premises by Tenant before the expiration of the term. Only a noticefromLandlord to Tenant
shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of the Premises and accomplish a termination of the
Lease. Landlord's consent to or approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or
approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval
of any subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing and
shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of the Lease.
20.

Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the covenants

and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days' prior written notice to
Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose advance such amounts as may be
9

necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense incurred or sum of money paid by
Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation
or provisions of this Lease or in defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by
reason of any such failure or any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for
the Premises and shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of
any installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any
other rent then due.
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or conditions of
this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any other lease or agreement between Landlord
and/or Tenant (other than the covenants for the payment of rent or other amounts) and any such
default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after notice, then Landlord may, at its
option, terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this
Lease shall expire as fully and completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the
expiration of the term of this Lease and Tenant shall immediately quit and surrender the
Premises. If such default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to remedy the
default.
21.

Default in Rent Cross Default Insolvency of Tenant If Tenant shall: (i)

abandon or vacate the Premises or any part thereof; (ii) admit in writing its inability to pay its
obligations generally as they become due; or (iii) if the leasehold estate created hereby shall be
taken on execution or by any process of law and not abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant
10

within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may continue this Lease in effect by not terminating
Tenant's right of possession of the Premises, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's
rights and remedies under this Lease, including therightto recover the rent specified in this
Lease as it becomes due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant'srightto possession of the
Premises, thereby terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of
the Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the state in
which the Premises are located, and recover as damagesfromTenant any amount necessary to
compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by Tenant's failure to perform its
obligations under this Lease. Landlord shall, in the event it is appropriate, make a commercially
reasonable effort to mitigate Tenant's damages by reletting the Premises on behalf of Tenant.
22.

Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless

Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, resulting
from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premises in accordance with the provisions of this
Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises or any part of the Premises after the early
expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the consent of Landlord (which
shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and Landlord does not notify Tenant in
writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days following expiration of the Term), absent
some other written agreement between the parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from
month to month (terminable by either party uponfifteen(15) days prior written notice) at a rental
in the amount provided above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the
terms of this Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of
the Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of
11

this Lease, without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in addition to any other remedies
available to it, have, all of the rights and remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1,
et seq.
23.

Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant and

condition herein contained.
24.

Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing-by Tenant

to remain against the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days upon actual notice of the
existence of such lien. Should any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that
time, unless Tenant shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof,
the same shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and discharge
any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder
to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premises. Tenant agrees to repay any such
sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, together with interest at the rate of eighteen
percent (18%) per annumfromthe date any such payment is made.
25.

No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any

purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's business or
otherwise.
26.

Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this

Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party shall receive its
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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27.

Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any

provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other
than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be affected by such invalidity.
Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law.
28.

No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and warrant

that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's fees in connection
with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other harmless from and against all
claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from any such brokerage
commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that Landlord has not dealt with any broker in
connection with this Lease.
29.

Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and Tenant

shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or more of the provisions of this Lease
shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The parties confirm that damages at law
may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or threatened breach by any party of any of the
provisions of this Lease. The parties' respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be
enforceable by specific performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy.
30.

Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be

deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed as follows:
If to the Landlord at the last known address:
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Ms. Bonita Carter
29 Lone Hollow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises and
Ms. Graciela Italiano-Thomas
Centro de la Familia de Utah
320 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
With a copy to:
Mr. Scott W. Hansen
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main Street, Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
33.

Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements

contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties
hereto and upon their respective successors in interest, assigns and legal representatives, except
as expressly otherwise provided heretofore.
34.

Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are for

convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving questions of
construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall set be allowed to record a
memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of Landlord. Each
provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a covenant and a condition.
This Lease shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah. This Agreement replaces all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental
of the Premises by Tenant

14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be executed
the day and year first above written.
LANDLORD:
Dream Chaser, LLC

By.

4LQQP-

Its Manager
TENANT:

Centre de lajamilia de Utah

By:
Its:

AT-

Gracielajftalianb-Thomas
Chief Executive Officer

327191
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LEASE AGREEMENT
(Store 105)
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this

day of October, 2000

(the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability company
("Landlord"), and Centra de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation
("Tenant"). Each Tenant shall be jointly and severally obligated hereunder.
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Leased Premise. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant,

the premise described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements
located thereon, and all of Landlord's rights, if any, in and to the premises described on
Exhibit "B" with each of said premise being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the
"Premises") for the term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties
herein set forth. Said premise includes improvements thereto.
2.

..^"^

Term. The initial term of this lease shall commence upon the

, 0

Effective Date and continue until 60 days after such time as either Landlord or Tenant

jr
shall give the other written notice of termination.
3.

^t^J-""*^

Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not

required to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holdsover after Landlord terminates this lease, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such
hold-over period at the rate of $8,000.00 per month.
4.

Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premise only for lawful

^

purposes. Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal
laws, restrictions and statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances.
5.

Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be

kept, used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premise, any article or material which
is prohibited by law, which is an environmental hazard, or which would render any fire
or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to the Premise void or voidable.
Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any such prohibited
material that are present as of the date hereof.
Tenant shall not use the Premise in any manner that will constitute waste,
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of
loudspeakers or sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the
Premise) to occupants of adjacent properties.
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premise that will cause damage to
the Premise, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
6.

Repair and Care of Building by Tenant. Tenant has inspected the

Premise and accepts the Premise AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the

-p

current sewer which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a
portion of the Premises. TeBaaUflfllLDoLnnmmit-any waste of tho Premise, nor shall it
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United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation of any municipal ordinanco orregulation applicable thoroto. Tenant may, with the prior written consent of Landlord,
but at its own cost and expense, in a good and workmanlike manner, make-such

alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the conduct of its business without,
however, materially altering the basic character of the building or improvements or
weakening any structure on the Premise. Tenant agrees to keep the interior of the
building and the improvements on the Premise, including those outside the building
and the parking lot and grounds and yard surfacing in good condition and repair,
including repairs to the electrical wiring, heating, air conditioning, plumbing systems,
and parking paving and to clean and paint the interior of the Premise as the same may
or might be necessary in order to maintain said Premise in a clean, attractive and
sanitary condition. Tenant shall keep any walkways, parking area and driveways
reasonably free from ice and snow. Any alterations or improvements to the Premise
shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this
Lease, except as herein otherwise provided.
Other than as provided in the Lease, Tenant shall not at any time prior to
or during the term hereof, either directly or indirectly, use any contractors in the
remodeling, repair or maintenance of the Premise or the building thereon. Any
contractor necessary to perform such work shall be first agreed upon by the Landlord
and Tenant, with the expense of such contractor's work to be paid by Tenant.
However, in the event of an emergencvjenant may employ the services of any
reputable Utah contractor to perform emergency corrective actions.
Tenant agrees to maintain the roof of the building and the building's
structure in good condition and repair.
7.

Erection and Removal of Signs. During the term of the lease,

Tenant may replace or add signage to the Premise for the purpose of indicating the

.

i^^-* •
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nature of the business carried on by the Tenant on said Premise; provided, however,
that such additional signage shall be first approved by Landlord, shall be in conformity
with all laws and ordinances in the district where the Premise are located. Damage to
the Premise caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and
paid for by Tenant.
8.

Glass. Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken or damaged

during the term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or
damaged.
9.

Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat,

gas, sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premise,
including deposits.
10.

Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its

best efforts to obtain an exception from the payment of property taxes based upon
Tenant's charitable use of the property. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all
notices of the general real property tax on the Premise. To the extent Tenant is
unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely pay the general real
property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental to the
conduct of Tenant's business on the Premise during the term of this Lease, including
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premise; provided, however, that
Tenant may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing
sufficient surety for the payment thereof. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give
Landlord proof of exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for
payment. Taxes for the first calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated

between the parties as of the date Tenant obtains possession of the Premise and taxes
for the last year shall be prorated to and including the date Tenant quits possession of
the Premise. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building permits) required as a result
of its improvements to the Premise. Special assessments imposed by any
governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that
enhance, or purport to enhance, the value of the Premise shall be paid between
Landlord and Tenant on such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering
the remaining period of Tenant's Lease and the useful life of the improvement in
question. The reasonable, useful life, for example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty
(20) years.
11.

Right of Entry bv Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or

representatives shall have the right to enter the Premises at all reasonable times during
regular business hours for any of the following purposes:
(a) To determine whether the Premise are in good condition and
whether Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease;
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an
emergency, in which case no notice shall be required), any necessary
maintenance including janitorial services and to make any restoration to the
Premise or the building and other improvements in which the Premise are
located that Landlord has the right to perform;
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed
under the provisions of this Lease;
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60)

days of the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while
Tenant is in default; and
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to
prospective brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest
in an exchange or purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this
Lease or any extension thereof.
Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience,
disturbance, loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's
entry on the Premise as provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or
permitted onto the Premise by Landlord or its agents). The above to the contrary not
withstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during such inspections in a reasonable
business like manner and shall be liable for physical injury or damage resulting from
the negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized representatives.
Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of its entry
on the Premise, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder.
12.

Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest

herein may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law,
and neither ail nor any part of the Premise shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of
longer than 30 days without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may
withhold its consent on any basis it may from time to time determine. Any such
assignment or sublease without Landlord's prior permission shall be void and
unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease.
13.

Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premise (or

any portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed , Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days
from the date of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of
Landlord's election to repair such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall
promptly repair the same; or (ii) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to
immediately terminate this Lease, in which event this Lease shall be so terminated
effective as of the date of such damage or destruction.
In the event of condemnation by any governmental authority of the
Premise or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to
conduct its business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall
terminate as of the date of occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds
and awards of condemnation, whether received pursuant to agreement between
Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of any court, shall be exclusively
paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the sole right to negotiate and conclude
a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in Landlord's sole
discretion.
14.

Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and

hold harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from
the Tenant's use of the Premise during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all
claims against the Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury
to persons in and upon the Premise from any cause whatsoever, except such as might
result from the negligence of the Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a
reasonable time after notice in writing by the Tenant requiring such performance by the
Landlord.

Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and
all claims of any kind or nature arising from (i) any use or occupancy of the Premise
after the
Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform as herein provided, (iii)
any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees, invitees or
licensees, and (iv) for all claims arising from violations of environmental and hazardous
waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after
the Effective Date..
15.

Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times

during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to
do business in the state in which the Premise is located, comprehensive public liability
insurance in the names of and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their
interests appear, with limits not less than:
Bodily Injury

$ 500 000 per person
$1,000,000 per occurrence

Property Damage

$1,000,000 per occurrence

Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket
coverage of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days
prior to the expiration of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a
satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment
of premium, shall be deposited with Landlord upon Landlord's request.
16.

Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance

on the Premise in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable

value, which insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all
premiums on such fire insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent
obtainable, provide that any loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of
any mortgage, as their respective interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or
negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise result in forfeiture of such insurance.
Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such insurance policy being in place, and
the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least thirty (30) days prior notice
of termination.
17.

Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up

the Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or
sooner termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as
altered pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the
elements excepted. Prior to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed
by Tenant, and repair all damages caused or incurred as a result of such removal.
18.

Quiet Enjoyment. If and so long as the Tenant pays the rent

reserved by this Lease and performs and observes all the covenants and provisions
hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premise, subject however, to the terms of this
Lease and subject to whatever rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the
Premises described on Exhibit "B" hereto.
19.

Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the

exercise of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such
a right or remedy or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including,
without limitation, the acceptance of the keys to the Premise, shall constitute an

acceptance of the surrender of the Premise by Tenant before the expiration of the term.
Only a notice from Landlord to Tenant shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of
the Premise and accomplish a termination of the Lease. Landlord's consent to or
approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or approval shall not be
deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval of any
subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing
and shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of
the Lease.
20.

Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the

covenants and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days'
prior written notice to Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose
advance such amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any
expense incurred or sum of money paid by Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant
to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation or provisions of this Lease or in
defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by reason of any such failure or
any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for the Premise and
shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of any
installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any
other rent then due.
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or
conditions of this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any of any other lease or
agreement between Landlord and/or Tenant {other than the covenants for the payment
of rent or other amounts) and any such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30)

days after notice, then Landlord may, at its option, terminate this Lease by giving
Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this Lease shall expire as fully and
completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the expiration of the term of
this Lease and Tenant shall then immediately quit and surrender the Premise. If such
default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of reasonable
diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to
remedy the default.
21.

Default in Rent. Cross Default, Insolvency of Tenant. If Tenant

shall: (i) abandon or vacate the Premise or any part thereof; (iii) admit in writing its
inability to pay its obligations generally as they become due; or (iv) if the leasehold
estate created hereby shall be taken on execution or by any process of law and not
abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may
continue this Lease in effect by not terminating Tenant's right of possession of the
Premise, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's rights and remedies under
this Lease, including the right to recover the rent specified in this Lease as it becomes
due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant's right to possession of the Premise, thereby
terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of the
Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the
state in which the Premises are located, and recover as damages from Tenant any
amount necessary to compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by
Tenant's failure to perform its obligations under this Lease. Landlord may, in addition
to any other remedy provided for by law or permitted herein, at its option, relet the

Premise on behalf of the Tenant.
22.

Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless

Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees,
resulting from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premise in accordance with the
provisions of this Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premise or any part of
the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the
consent of Landlord (which shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and
Landlord does not notify Tenant in writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days
following expiration of the Term), absent some other written agreement between the
parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from month to month (terminable by either
party upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice) at a rental in the amount provided
above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the terms of this
Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of the
Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner
termination of this Lease without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in
addition to any other remedies available to it, have all of the rights and remedies set
forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1, et seq.
23.

Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term,

covenant and condition herein contained.
24.

Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing by

Tenant to remain against the Premise for a period of more than thirty (30) days. Should
any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that time, unless Tenant
shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof, the same

shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and
discharge any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premise which Tenant
is obligated hereunder to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premise.
Tenant agrees to repay any such sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor,
together with interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date
any such payment is made.
25.

No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for

any purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's
business or otherwise.
26.

Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of

this Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party
shall receive its costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
27.

Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any

provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or
circumstances other than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be
affected by such invalidity. Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable
to the fullest extent permitted by law.
28.

No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and

warrant that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's
fees in connection with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other

harmless from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees,
arising from any such brokerage commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that
Landlord has not dealt with any broker in connection with this Lease.
29.

Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and

Tenant shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or more of the
provisions of this Lease shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The
parties confirm that damages at law may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or
threatened breach by any party of any of the provisions of this Lease. The parties'
respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be enforceable by specific
performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy.
30.

Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder

shall be deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States
marl, postage prepaid, and addressed as fallows: If to the Landlord at the fast known
address.
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises.
33.

Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and

agreements contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be
binding upon the parties hereto and upon their respective successors in interest,
assigns and legal representatives, except as expressly otherwise provided heretofore.
34.

Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are

for convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving
questions of construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall not record
this Lease or a memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of

Landlord. Each provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a
covenant and a condition. This Lease shall be governed by and construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. This Agreement replaces
all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental of the Premises by Tenant,
(the remainder of this page is left intentionally blank)
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be
executed the day and year first above written.
LANDLORD:
Dream Chaser, LLC

By
Its Manager
TENANT:
Central de le Familia de Utah

By
Its
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Charitable Fund
American Express
Western States
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Catherine Ortega
Dani Hartv|jfen
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! Centro tie la Familia de
I Utah would like to express
our utmost appreciation to
David & Bonnie Carter for
their exceptional vision
j and foresight. Their very
I generous donation of the
| Honeyville School in
j Northern Utah will allow us
I to serve an expanding
1 population of migrant
I families in the northern
1 Utah area and perpetuates
| the legacy of a building
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THE

CARTER

FAMILY

F O TJ N U A I I v ^

March 23,2001
Graciella Italiano-Thomas
Centro del la Familia de Utah
320 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Dear Dr. Italiano Thomas:
Dream Chaser IXC is now owned by The Carter Family Foundation. The lease entered into by Dream
Chaser LLC and Centro de la FamSa de Utah is still in force for the two-year period specified. At the end of
the lease, Dream Chaser LLC and/or The Carter Family Foundation intend to renew the lease for a period of
ten years and for subsequent periods of ten years in perpetuity until such time as the lease is broken by your
party or the facility is no longer needed.
The Carter Family Foundation supports your organization's work and is pleased to be able to support your
project for many years to come.

Sincerely,

Bonita Kay Carter

BKC
Enclosure

29 LONE HOLLOW DRIVE • SANDY, UT • 84092
PHONE: 801-553-7150 • FAX: 801-553-7161
BQNITCARTFRfflHQTMAfT.

COM
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CENTRO EL LA FAMILIA
DE UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 020904669
vs.
BONITA CARTER, et al,
Defendant,

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
March 31, 2003

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

David Burns
Scott Anderson
BUCKLAND, ORTON, DARGER,
HANSEN, WALDO & BARTON
9 Exchange Place, Ste. 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)531-6686

For the Respondent:

Kevin Anderson
(No information given)

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded March 31, 2003)

3

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. This is the time

4

set for hearing on the application for preliminary injunction

5

in the matter of Centro El La Familia De Utah vs. Bonita

6

Carter, et cetera.

7

record.

8
9

Counsel, state your appearances for the

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, David Burns, co-counsel with
Scott Hansen for plaintiffs, (inaudible) Utah (inaudible).

10

THE COURT: Very well.

11

MR. ANDERSON: Kevin Anderson on behalf of Bonita

12

Carter (inaudible).

13

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. Let me

14

indicate that I've reviewed the pleadings both in support of

15

and in opposition to the preliminary injunction application,

16

and I'll allow you to proceed.

17

argue this matter?

Mr. Burns, are you going to

18

MR. BURNS: I am, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.

20

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I'll certainly endeavor not to

21

repeat what we've already said in the papers. I think this

22

case is factually involved.

23

facts any more than I think is absolutely necessary.

24
25

I'm not going to summarize the

As we set out in our papers, I think there are really
only two issues for the Court to determine based on the

~3~
1

response, and that is whether there's a contract and

2

additionally, whether we qualify for an exception to the

3

statute of frauds under the prior performance exception.

4

A quick comment about the standard that applies to

5

both of those issues. The case law requires that there be a

6

contract shown by clear and definite terms, which is not to say

7

we're talking about an ordinary contract in an ordinary

8

commercial transaction.

9

What it does mean bringing into play the prior

10

performance exception that the Court is now sitting in equity,

11

and the Court —

12

prior performance exception to the statute of frauds is

13

designed to just do that, prevent a fraud —

14

a fraud.

15

light.

16

that the exception —

this exception, the

a perpetration of

The Court is — will review these facts in that

We think that there's clearly evidence —

I should

17

also add that the cases clearly establish that the number one

18

issue or the most important factual determinant in this context

19

is whether there were substantial improvements which

20

permanently altered the property — the lands to be conveyed.

21

We think we've presented evidence which clearly establishes

22

that property that was purchased for $72,500 was permanently

23 I altered and substantially improved by city (inaudible)
24 | $680,000 — more than $680,000 in improvements.
25 |

That basically in a nutshell is the basis for our

-41

preliminary injunction.

2

(inaudible) demand that CDLF evict —

3

premises immediately.

4

This is occasioned by the lessor's
that we vacate the

The parties were in negotiations for quite some time

5

after the case was filed, were not able to resolve their

6

differences.

7

issued in February.

8

temporary injunction — have to go to the trouble of a TRO and

9

were able to agree that we would just come in on a preliminary

10

The request — or the demand that we vacate was
They agreed to not go forward with a

injunction, hence the reason for our appearance today.

11

What we're asking the Court to do is enter a

12

preliminary injunction preventing enjoining the defendants,

13

Dream Chasers, from evicting CDLF from this premises, and we

14

set the reasons out in our papers.

15

I'd like to make a comment about the irreparable harm

16

element.

17

substantial likelihood of — potential likelihood of

18

(inaudible) they've also made a few comments about irreparable

19

harm allegations.

20

facts to dispute our presentations that the facility provides

21

care to 130 children that are registered there. On a typical

22

day the facility has served about 80 to 90 children, and that

23

those children would then be without daycare — would be

24

without the Headstart services that are provided. They

25

essentially — there would be no other facility for them to go

They raised that as their second — besides the

I don't think they really presented any

-51

to.

2

CDLF provides the only Migrant Headstart program in

3

the state, so it serves all the migrants — nobody else

4

provides those services. There's only one other Migrant

5

Headstart program in northern Utah and it's in Garland, Utah,

6

which is about 10 miles from Honeyville. They simply have no

7

space.

8
9

I will say that just because of the seasons and the
way that this system operates, CDLF just —

the season ended

10

for these migrant services, but will resume on June 1st.

11

Essentially this is determined by the migrant season, and when

12

we reopen our doors —

13

time, but we will reopen our doors on June 1st, certainly this

14

case may not be over by June 1st, and these children will be

15

brought back to that facility.

16

somebody stays in the facility all the

We think that we've made a clear showing of

17

irreparable harm.

18

children to go in this state.

19
20

There's simply nowhere else for these

In my opinion, this case, the motion for preliminary
injunction really turns on the substantial likelihood of

21 I success upon the merits. We've presented our case. I think
22 | we've gone the extra mile to try and lay out for the Court the
23 | stories and events that happened — we've done it in a
24 | compressed period —

the parties have not taken discovery, but

25 | I think most of this evidence, if we pare out what might have
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been said by the defendants and what might have been said by

2

the plaintiff, we just look at the objective evidence, that's

3

probably going to be essentially undisputed, and we think that

4

objective evidence clearly establishes that there was a promise

5

to convey.

6

Now I should add that one of the issues that has

7

arisen here is whether this was a gift or whether it was a

8

contract, whether it was enforceable, or when was the

9

consideration given.

10

That issue arises because the defendant, Ms. Carter,

11

sent a letter on March 23rd of 2001 which —

12

letter is not by any means a model of clarity.

13

"I'm not going to give you this property."

14

the owner of the property, Dream Chasers, has been transferred

15

to the family foundation and then it made an offer to lease the

16

property in perpetuity.

17

acted upon by CDLF.

18

I should add that
It doesn't say,

It simply says that

That was simply something that was not

Ms. Carter continues to monitor the progress of the

19

improvements.

20

between CDLF and in particular, Ms. Thomas, the CEO and

21

Ms. Carter about this letter until a year later. Ms. Carter

22

never mentioned it in any of the conversations she had with

23

Ms. Thomas, and they were discussing matters about every four

24

to six weeks.

25

They never —

there was never any discussion

Ms. Thomas kept Ms. Carter informed of the progress

-7of improvements. Ms. Carter even said that she was aware of —
she commented to Ms. Thomas that she was impressed by the
materials that were being used.

We're not sure if she actually

visited the site herself or if she had one of her family
members that visited, but this is after the improvements were
actually begun on the ground.
Now we've also set out in our papers evidence of proof
that we certainly changed our position before this letter was
ever sent. Architects were hired and about $13,000 had already
been expended by the time this letter went out.
We think that there was a contract, and that there was
consideration.

There was certain forbearance, there was change

in position, but in the final analysis this isn't the issue.
The cases clearly establish —

in fact, the Harbras case, which

deals with this same issue, says explicitly that it was raised
in that case by the defendant, that the Court was relying upon
the (inaudible) which had involved a transaction, a parol
gifted property.
The defendant in the Harbras case tried to distinguish
themselves from that prior case, and that was rejected by the
Utah Supreme Court.

It quite explicitly said that there is no

difference when the Court is sitting in equity and measuring
matters under the prior performance exception.
The clear implication here is that the Court is doing
equity for purpose of the statute of frauds —

the exception to
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the statute of frauds is that the Court will essentially act to

2

prevent a fraud.

3

consideration or whether there was an enforceable contractr we

4

don't think that's an issue.

5

Whether this was a gift or whether there was

The only issue is whether there was substantial

6

improvements that materially altered the premises. That's also

7

an important issue when it comes to addressing their claim that

8

the lease agreement is the contract that actually refers to or

9

concerns the improvements.

10

We distinguish — we pointed out that that lease

11

agreement was essentially a form document, and it was passed

12

right through with no revision on this paragraph six.

13

It is reasonable to assume that that paragraph would

14

have had seme changes had it been the paragraph that would

15

govern $680,000 worth of improvements.

16

that the consideration for the agreement as was cited up front

17

that we also pointed out, and that recital said that the

18

consideration for the lease agreement is basic maintenance of

19

the facility, payment of insurance and payment of property

20

taxes. It doesn't mention CDLF substantial improvements.

21

just mentions basic maintenance.

22

I should also point out

It

In fact, when we cite sections of the language in

23

paragraph six, clearly it's just referring to basic

24

maintenance.

25

altered the premises. And again, those cases which look at

CDLF wasn't basic maintenance, it materially

-9this issue really may come down on one side of whether the
prior performance that is found where there is substantial
improvements that materially altered the premises and that
prior performance is not allowed when there are no material
changes in the promises.
Suffice it to say where the Courts are agreeing with
the defendant's position, this would cause a great injustice, a
great inequity.

It would be a tremendous windfall to the

defendant. There was clearly detrimental reliance throughout
this period.
We've presented objective evidence, newspaper reports
quoting Ms. Carter.
Carters.

We have direct representation by the

We have minutes — board minutes from the Box Elder

School District. We have board minutes or a board minute from
CDLF identifying the transaction. We later have a 2000 annual
report which was sent well after this March letter.
"Thank you for the donation."

It says,

It has the Carters' picture in

the donor section and sent to the Carters, and the Carters sent
it right back to say, "Well, no, we changed our mind."

They in

fact — Ms. Carter, even though she was speaking to Ms. Thomas,
never once said that the transfer of conveyance was not going
to take place until after the improvements had been completed.
That was in the spring of 2002.
So we'll basically just submit —
qualify —

if this doesn't

if there is not a substantial likelihood of success
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on the merits under the standards governing (inaudible) form of

2

exception, then I don't know what would.

3

performed on (inaudible) objective statements or objective

4

conduct to believe that we have an agreement.

5

We've clearly

Basically we'll submit it on that basis. We also

6

filed a motion before the stipulation.

Quite frankly we didn't

7

have an opportunity to provide a reply brief, although

8

(inaudible) hustling to get this in, to gather the facts

9

together to piece this story together so we could present a

10

coherent explanation about what happened as we understood it.

11

But I think I'm pretty comfortable submitting it on our initial

12

brief that was submitted.

13

We've attached Mr. Hansen's letter. Basically Counsel

14

got together in September. The purpose of that meeting was not

15

a discovery planning meeting, as the defendants suggest. It

16

was to involve —

17

plaintiffs —

18

the very —

19

case before any of us spent any further money.

20

into the mix and sent over a proposed discovery plan, but the

21

purpose of that meeting was let's see if we can settle this.

22

actually that was my initiation as the

I initiated that discussion or that meeting for

for the singular purpose of trying to resolve this
I also threw

Mr. Hansen had followed that meeting up with a

23

confirming letter. That letter said that, "You've agreed to

24

let us stay in the premises rent free during the pendency of

25

this case." That letter was not —

there was no response to

-11that letter.
We think we had an agreement at the meeting. We
were all acting on behalf of our clients. Mr. Hansen has —
defendant's Counsel has submitted papers to the effect that
they didn't receive that letter.

I certainly don't question

Mr. Anderson's integrity by any means, but it is quite
mysterious to us how that could happen.
On the letter itself it says —
facsimile and by regular mail.

it was sent by

I was in another law firm at

the time. The copy that's actually attached to our papers is
the copy that I received at Parson Davies. So I received my
mail copy as a "cc" on that letter. CDLF received its copy as
a "cc" on that letter, and I think it's reasonable to assume
that the main addressees would have received a copy as well.
We think that would be another basis for the Court to
simply prevent this eviction from going forward.
evidence to disprove that they didn't —

We don't have

or that they did

receive it, but again, we have some inferences that we think
are pretty compelling.

It's on that basis, your Honor, that

(inaudible).
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Burns.
Mr. Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON: Maybe I'll start with the last issue
first.

As to perhaps why Counsel did not receive it in the

mail, the most logical explanation to me is the fact that our

-12Itrs a letter that we

1

address is incorrect on the letter.

2

never did receive.

3

September 3rd.

4

the letter, Mr. Bell and I had differences of opinion, and

5

Mr. Hansen and Mr. Burns were told we needed to take it to our

6

clients.

7

It is an agreement which was never made on

We met. We discussed it. As indicated in

It seems curious that the letter would note a

8

disagreement between Counsel and then they're asserting that

9

there was some kind of agreement that was actually reached.

10

spoke to the clients after the meeting.

11

next day and told him that we were willing to allow them to

12

stay in as long as we were continuing to negotiate in good

13

faith, because that wasn't again a negotiation process.

14

I called Mr. Burns the

With respect to the merits of the claims here, the

15

difficulty with the contract issue is the formation of the

16

contract and what were the terms of the contract.

17

We

Even if you look at the evidence that they have

18

presented, Ms. Italiano Thomas' affidavit makes it clear that

19

there was a significant change in the agreement at virtually

20

the last minute when she states in her affidavit that the

21

agreement changed from, "You're going to get titles in August,"

22

to, "There's going to be a two year lease."

23

There are two significant parts to the timing of these

24

promises.

I believe virtually every statement that they have

25

as to the nature of this contract occurred before the Carters
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had title.

2

in the future if and when the Carters ever did acquire title.

3

Title was not acquired until September 28th of 2000.

4

So it is nothing but an agreement to perhaps agree

All of the statements that they're relying on all

5~ predate that.

It's a-classic agreement to-agree". It's a

6

classic statement of a future intent to do something. Those

7

are not enforceable in a court of equity or in the Court's law,

8
9

The other significant aspect of the timing issue
relates to the consideration.

There was absolutely no work

10

done to improve the property until several months after they

11

received a letter dated March 23rd of 2001. They may have paid

12

architects. We haven't done any discovery.

13

of their documents are numbered doesn't mean that we've

14

received them, other than what we've got. I didn't actually

15

get them until Saturday because they came after I left the

16

office Friday.

17

The fact that some

Payments to the architect do not directly benefit

18

the property.

They do not fall within the part performance

19

standard set out in the Bradshaw and several of the other cases

20

that both parties have cited and relied on.

21

The only difficult thing about this for your Honor and

22

for us is trying to understand what CDLF is up to. The Carters

23

have, even through the negotiations, which continued after this

24

lawsuit was filed, have been more than willing to allow the

25

long-term use of this property.

The March 23rd letter was not
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any new offer that was made.

2

Carters intended to do and in fact are willing to do.

3

until the lawsuit was filed that we learned that CDLF wanted

4

nothing to do with that.

5

That was a statement of what the
It's not

They have taken- a posture in this-litigation that it's

6

title or apparent —

for apparently nothing, and having taken

7

that choice, I guess they are going to be left with nothing.

8

It doesn't seem to me the least bit problematic that they would

9

put $600,000, more or less — we've received three different

10

figures in the course of this litigation —

11

that money into the property on the strength of the March 23rd

12

letter.

13

to the significant investment in a property that they were

14

going to be able to lease, even for one ten-year period to

15

justify the costs that they had put into it.

16

that they would put

I don't see any difference from their point of view as

The improvements were not something that was bargained

17

for by the Carters. The Carters didn't say, you know, "You

18

need to improve this to bring it up to the Headstart

19

performance standards," the Carters didn't care about that.

20

That was something that CDLF did for CDLF's own benefit.

21

Again, it is consideration —

22

referable to the contract —

23

sale.

24
25

or it is performance that is not
this supposed oral contract of

Your Honor, for them to —

I think it's fairly classic

circumstance, many of the cases involved property where even

-15more significant work was actually done on the property, the
erection of buildings, the erection of fences, in some of the
early cases, and the Court simply said, "That's not enough
because those acts were benefitting the user of the property
-lor his-use of the property."

It- didn'-t necessarily benefit

the owner, and they were not acts that were done in
consideration of an agreement to get title.

They were acts

that were done for CDLF's benefit for CDLF to utilize the
property.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Anderson, thank you.
Mr. Burns, this being your application, I'll grant you a very
limited opportunity to respond, if you wish to do so.
MR. BURNS:

I can just submit it, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

I believe that the respective

briefs detail the circumstances sufficiently for me to rule;
however, I'm going to take the motion under advisement.

I will

notify you shortly of my decision by minute entry ruling.
Thank you.

We'll be in recess.

(Hearing concluded)
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:

Pursuant to the hearing held March 31, 2003, the Court rules
as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied
for the

reasons

specified

in the opposing memoranda

articulated at oral argument.
2. Counsel for defendant to prepare the order.

and as
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Defendants.
This Court having considered Plaintiff Centra de la Familia de Utah's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Enforce Stipulation, and the Court having reviewed and
considered the pleading and other papers on file, the Motions and supporting and opposing memoranda,
the affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to the Motions, the exhibits and other evidence
presented, as well as the arguments of counsel, presented at the hearing held on March 31,2003, the

Court, having entered a Minute Entry Ruling on April 2,2003, now adopts and enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Centra de la Familia de Utah ("CDLF") is a Utah nonprofit corporation

with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. CDLF provides educational and
advocacy services to migrant and Hispanic communities throughout Utah, and is the principal provider
of migrant Head Start services in this State.
2.

Defendant Bonita K. ("Bonnie") Carter, is an individual residing in Salt Lake

County, Utah. Carter is the Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation (the "Foundation"). The
Foundation is a Utah nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County,
Utah.
3.

Defendant Dream Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser") is a Utah limited liability

company with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

In 1998, CDLF became aware that its lease at the Intermountain Indian School in

Brigham City would not be renewed because the property was to be sold to a developer. Affidavit of
Thomas Hogan ("Hogan" Aff.") f 2. In 1999, CDLF located and attempted to acquire a surplus
elementary school in North Ogden. This effort was dropped after community opposition was voiced.
March 27, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ("Second Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 2.
5.

Thomas Hogan, on behalf of CDLF, began scouting other locations. Mr. Hogan

heard that the Box Elder School District planned to close the Honeyville Elementary School (the
"Property") and had declared it surplus property. Hogan Aff, f 3.

6.

On September 29,1999, the Board of Education (the "Board") of the Box Elder

County School District ("School District") voted to declare Honeyville Elementary School property (the
"Property") as surplus at the end of the school year. Affidavit of Ronald L. Frandsen ("Frandsen Aff.")
12 and Ex. 1.
7.

Graciela Italiano-Thomas and Mr. Hogan, attended an April 26, 2000 School

District Board meeting on behalf of CDLF. They requested that the board donate the Property to CDLF
for its use as a Migrant Head Start center. Frandsen Aff. f 4 and Ex. 3.
8.

Mr. Frandsen, who regularly attended School District Board meetings during this

time and was ultimately put in charge of the sale of the Property, never received any inquiry or offer
from CDLF concerning the purchase of the Property, and never heard that any inquiries or offers to
purchase had ever been made by CDLF to the School District. Frandsen Aff. fj 1 and 15. See also
March 6, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ("First Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 5 ("it was
unlikely we would be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property").
9.

Initially, the Property was made available to the public through a legal notice and

sealed bid process. Frandsen Aff. f 5. Only one bid was received from a local developer, Scott
Mitchell, to purchase the Property for $5,000, which was not responsive to the bid specifications. Id.
10.

The School District Board was unwilling to give the Property to CDLF. First

Italiano-Thomas Affidavit f 5; Hogan Aff. f 4. The School District was interested in seeking additional
bids for the Property. Affidavit of Bonita K. Carter ("Carter Aff.") $ 3 . See also Frandsen Aff. f 14.
11.

After reading a May 31, 2000 article in the Salt Lake Tribune entitled: "Honeyville

Residents Say Goodbye to 81-Year-Old Elementary School", Bonnie Carter became aware that the
elementary school she had attended as a child was scheduled to be closed and the building sold. She

also learned that CDLF was interested in using the Property to house its Migrant Head Start program in
Box Elder County. Carter Aff. f 2.
12.

In early June 2000, Bonnie Carter met with Ms. Italiano-Thomas at CDLF's Salt

Lake office. During the meeting they discussed of the idea of the Carters acquiring the Property and
making a donation to CDLF of the use of the Property for its Migrant Head Start program in Box Elder
County. Carter Aff. <H 4, 7-8; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. <H 5-7.
13.

During Bonnie Carter's meeting with Ms. Italiano-Thomas an outright donation of

title to the Property to the CDLF was discussed. Carter Aff. f 7; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 6. This
was one of several possibilities discussed during that meeting. Carter Aff. f 7 . Bonnie Carter said she
and her husband intended to purchase the Property in August and immediately convey it to CDLF.
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. % 10. While this possibility was discussed, the Carters had not made a
final decision and there was no commitment made to CDLF that they would do so. Carter Aff. f 7;
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 7.
14.

Following this meeting, Ms. Italiano-Thomas sent a letter to Ms, Carter. Carter

Aff. I l l ; First Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 4 and Ex. A. This letter contains no reference to any promise or
firm commitment to make an outright donation of title to the Property having been made during the
meeting. First Italiano-Thomas Aff. Ex. A. The letter merely refers to an undefined "generous
proposal" and "gift", and acknowledges that there were "many details to work out." Id. Rather than a
statement that CDLF and Bonnie Carter had entered into binding agreement, Ms. Italiano-Thomas
states: "I earnestly hope this donation can go forward." First Italiano-Thomas Aff. Ex. A. See also
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 7 ("I enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to
finalize an agreement to convey the Property.").

15.

Shortly after this meeting, Bonnie Carter began negotiating with Mr. Frandsen of

the School District concerning the purchase of the Property. Carter Aff. f 12; Frandsen Aff. f 6.
16.

In July 2000, the Carters offered to buy the Property for $30,000, with the closing

date set in early August 2000. Carter Aff. f 15; Frandsen Aff. 111.
17.

Ms. Italiano-Thomas refers to another meeting in July 2000 at which the donation

of the Property to CDLF was discussed. At that meeting, the Carters discussed postponing the actual
conveyance of the Property to CDLF until after CDLF had used its funds to improve the Property in
order to claim a charitable tax deduction based on the value of the Property after the anticipated
improvements had been made. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 9.
18.

The School District wanted more money for the Property and Bonnie Carter and

Mr. Frandsen continued to negotiate. Carter Aff. f 16; Frandsen Aff. 511.
19.

Bonnie Carter investigated the possibility of obtaining marketable title to a

southern parcel owned by Elzarus Hunsaker (the "South Parcel"), but used by the Honeyville
Elementary School pursuant to a verbal arrangement as a septic system drainage field, among other
things. Carter Aff. ff 13-14, 17-18; Frandsen Aff. If 7-8 and Ex. 5. This effort was ultimately
unsuccessful, but delayed the closing to the end of September 2000. Carter Aff. f 18.
20.

The Carters and Mr. Frandsen eventually agreed that the School District Board

would sell the Property to Dream Chaser, an entity formed by the Carters specifically to own and
manage the Property, for $72,500. Carter Aff. ff 1 and 20; Frandsen Aff. 111.
21.

On September 27, 2000, the School District Board met and voted to approve the

sale of the Property to Dream Chaser for $72,500. Carter Aff. f 21; Frandsen Aff. f 12 and Ex. 6.

22.

To assist with the creation of Dream Chaser, the closing on the Property and the

preparation of a lease agreement with CDLF, the Carters employed Jay B. Bell and the law firm of
Fabian & Clendenin. Carter Aff. f 25.
23.

Being unable to obtain marketable title to the South Parcel, the Carters decided to

lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period, with the idea that they would decide whether
to make an outright gift of the Property to CDLF by the end of the two year period. Carter Aff. f 23.
The decision to lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period was communicated to CDLF
by Bonnie Carter to Ms. Italiano-Thomas sometime before the closing. Carter Aff. f 24; Second
Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 13.
24.

The sale of the Property to Dream Chaser was concluded on September 28, 2000.

Carter Aff. f 26; Frandsen Aff. f 16. The School District gave Dream Chaser a Warranty Deed to the
North Parcel, Frandsen Aff. Ex. 7, and a Quit Claim Deed to the South Parcel. Frandsen Aff. Ex. 8.
25.

None of the statements of intent to convey the Property made by the Carters to

representatives of CDLF occurred after the Carters, through Dream Chaser, had obtained title to the
Property. First Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 3 (mid 2000); id. f 4 (June 8, 2000); Second Italiano-Thomas
Aff. f 4 (early June 2000); id. f 6 (June 8, 2000); id. f 9 (July 2000); id. f 10 (during two prior
conversations in June 2000); id. f 11 (September 27, 2000); Hogan Aff. f 6 (early June 2000); id. f 1
(July 2000).
26.

CDLF admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by Carter.

Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum p. 1. The "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF, Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support f 12, pp. iii-iv, support do not express a clear and definite promise to convey
title to the Property to CDLF.

27.

Within days of the closing on the Property, Mr. Bell began working on a draft lease

agreement between Dream Chaser and CDLF and sent the draft lease agreement to Mr. Scott W.
Hansen, counsel for CDLF. Affidavit of Jay B. Bell ("Bell Aff.") f l 4, 6. Counsel for both parties
negotiated the lease agreement and traded numerous drafts back and forth. Bell Aff. f l 6-7,11 and
Exs. 1-2.
28.

During the negotiations, Mr. Hansen proposed that the lease be simultaneously

executed with a pledge of the Property to assure that CDLF would get title to the Property at some point
in the future. Bell Aff. f 8 and Ex. L
29.

Mr. Hansen's proposal was rejected and Mr. Bell informed Mr. Hansen there was,

and could be, no enforceable promise to contribute title to the Property. Bell Aff. f 9. Any such
promise would have limited the Carters' charitable contribution for tax purposes. Id. Mr. Bell did not
agree to have the Carters execute a pledge agreement of the Property. Bell Aff. f 10. No pledge of the
Property was prepared by Mr. Bell or sent to Mr. Bell by Mr. Hansen. Id.
30.

On December 12,2000, the final version of the lease agreement was hand-delivered

to Mr. Hansen for his client's signature. Bell Aff. f 12. It was subsequently returned to Mr. Bell, signed
by Ms. Italiano-Thomas on behalf of CDLF and mailed to Bonnie Carter for her signature on December
18,2000. Id. Bonnie Carter hand wrote in the definitive date, backdating the lease to October 1,2000,
and signed it (the "Lease Agreement"). Carter Aff. f 30 and Ex. 1.
31.

On December 22, 2000, the Carters transferred their interest in Dream Chaser to the

Foundation, a non-profit corporation formed by the Carters. Carter Aff. f 33 and Ex. 2. It was the
transfer of this interest for which the Carters took a charitable deduction on their federal tax returns, not
any transfer of any interest in the Property to CDLF or after improvements had been made. Carter Aff.

134. This was how the Carters had planned to take the tax advantage of the charitable gift. Carter Aff.
133.
32.

Sometime in October 2000, Bonnie Carter read an October 7,2000 Deseret News

article regarding a Migrant Head Start center in Provo, operated by CDLF, being shut down. Carter Aff.
f 37 and Ex. 4. The statement attributed to Ms. Italiano-Thomas in the article that "the Provo center was
not offering the quality of care demanded of Head Start" and allegations that the operation provided
poor care and served spoiled food caused Bonnie Carter a great deal of concern. It made her realize that
anything could happen in the future and to be concerned about what would happen to the Property if
CDLF could not operate the facility or became defunct in the future. Carter Aff. <f 37.
33.

The October 7, 2000 Deseret News article refers to a Provo Migrant Head Start

center operated by CDLF being shut down. Carter Aff. Ex, 4. CDLF worked with licensed providers to
find day care for the affected children and successfully accommodated a few children it at another
facility it operated. Id.
34.

In addition, Bonnie Carter's continuing efforts to obtain marketable title to the

South Parcel were proving fruitless. Carter Aff. f][ 28, 38.
35.

On March 23, 2001, Bonnie Carter wrote a letter to Ms. Italiano-Thomas stating

that at the end of the two-year Lease Agreement, Dream Chaser intended to renew the Lease Agreement
for a period of ten years and for subsequent periods of ten years in perpetuity until such time as the
Lease Agreement was broken by CDLF or the Property was no longer needed by CDLF. Carter Aff.
f 40 and Ex. 5.
36.

Ms. Italiano-Thomas received the March 23, 2001 letter, but did not act on it.

Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 27. After consulting with counsel, CDLF rejected the terms of the

March 23, 2001 letter. Id.; March 6, 2003 Affidavit of Scott W. Hansen f 11; Bell Aff. Ex. 3. See also
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support f 14, p. iv. The Carters never received any notice from CDLF that
the offer in the March 23,2001 letter was unacceptable. Carter Aff. f 44.
37.

At the time the March 23, 2001 letter was sent, no renovation or construction had

occurred at the Property and CDLF had not moved any of its operations or programs to the Property.
Carter Aff. ff 41-43 and Ex. 6. At most, CDLF had paid $13,320 for architectural services. Second
Italiano-Thomas Aff. % 20.
38.

Demolition, construction and remodeling work on the Property did not begin until

late April or May 2001. Carter Affidavit fj 42,43 and Ex. 6. The improvements to the Property were
necessary to bring it into compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff.
ffl8,16-17.
39.

After receiving the March 23, 2001 letter, CDLF asserts that over the next fourteen

months it spent $667,270.91 ($680,590.91 — $13,320) improving the Property. Second
Italiano-Thomas Aff. H 20, 22 and Ex. G.
40.

CDLF began occupying the Property on June 1, 2002. First Italiano-Thomas Aff.

f 6; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 23.
41.

On May 31,2002, CDLF filed a Verified Complaint alternatively seeking damages

and equitable restitution for breach of an alleged the oral contract to convey the Property to CDLF,
unjust enrichment and fraud, as well as punitive damages. The Defendants filed an Answer and
Counterclaim generally seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no agreement to convey, and a
judgment rescinding the letter of March 23, 2001. On February 21, 2003, CDLF filed a Motion for
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint, which asks for specific performance of the oral agreement to

convey the Property, a declaration quieting title with respect to the right to ownership of the Property
and, in particular, the right to enforce the agreement to convey the Property to CDLF and damages for
unjust enrichment and fraud. The parties have stipulated to an Order Granting Leave to File First
Amended Complaint with the jury trial demand stricken.
42.

CDLF's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that its Migrant Head Start

services at the Property ended on March 21, 2003 and are not scheduled to resume until June 1, 2003.
See also Frandsen Aff. Ex. 2.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) sets forth the four elements required for a

preliminary injunction to issue. Defendants only challenge CDLF's ability to satisfy the first and fourth
elements:
(1)
The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction
issues;

(4)
There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits
which should be the subject of further litigation.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(l) and (4).
2.

Because injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy," it "should not be lightly

granted." Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1983). CDLF has the burden to
establish that it has satisfied all four of the required elements. Water & Energy Sys. Tech. Inc. v. Keil,
1999 UT 16, f 7, 974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999).
3.

Rule 65A(e)(4) requires, at a minimum, that CDLF make a prima facie showing

"that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved." Water & Energy Sys.'Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999

UT 16, f 8 (citations omitted). In its First Amended Complaint, CDLF has alleged four causes of action.
In seeking a preliminary injunction, it relies only upon its claim for breach of an oral agreement to
convey title to the Property to CDLF in exchange for substantial improvements CDLF made to
rehabilitate the Property.
4.

The first element required to prove a prima facie case of breach of contract is the

existence of a valid, enforceable contract. Under Utah law, there must be a meeting of the minds.
Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). CDLF's reliance on the doctrine
of part performance as either a means to avoid the statute of frauds or as a substitute for consideration,
does not relieve CDLF of the requirement that it prove the existence of an agreement and the terms
thereof. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) ("To meet the part performance exception to
the statute of frauds [citation omitted] the terms of the oral contract must be clear and definite and
established by clear and definite testimony.").
5.

Here, none of the facts relied on by CDLF demonstrate that the Carters ever

expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the Property to
CDLF. CDLF has no evidence that the offer was a firm commitment, as opposed to a mere agreement
to agree. So called "agreements to agree" are generally unenforceable. Harmon v. Greenwood, 596
P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) (holding that statement of intent was not itself an enforceable contract
because it only purported to be a letter indicating parties' intention to enter into binding agreement at
later time); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1961) (stating that "where there was simply some
nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it").

6.

The Utah Statute of Frauds provides that "[e]very contract... for the sale, of any

lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2002).
7.

Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2002) provides that "[n]o estate or interest in

real property . .. shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing."
8.

Pursuant to the Utah Statute of Frauds, CDLF's claim fails for two reasons: 1) the

claimed contract is admittedly not in writing; and 2) none of the asserted "memorializations" of the
agreement are "subscribed by" Bonnie Carter or any authorized agent for Dream Chaser or the
Foundation. Thus, none of the "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF satisfy the statute of frauds.
See Baugh v. City of Logan, 495 P.2d 814 (Utah 1972) (holding that meeting minutes did not satisfy the
statute of frauds because there was nothing to indicate that they had been subscribed to by the party by
whom the sale was to be made).
9.

Because CDLF admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by

Carter, an exception to the Statute of Frauds is relied upon to establish the likelihood that CDLF will
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim. Specifically, CDLF asserts that the oral agreement to
convey is excepted from the Statute of Frauds by the doctrine of part performance. Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-5-8.
10.

The evidentiary burden is on CDLF to "establish the contract by clear, convincing,

and definite evidence and to show that the acts of part performance done pursuant to the contract were

also clear, definite and referable exclusively to the contract." Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980)
(citing Holmgren Bros, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (1975)). See also Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274
(Utah 1983) ("it must be proved by strong evidence"); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah
1953); Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 770 (1906).
11.

CDLF argues that the expenditure of approximately $681,000 to renovate the

Property constituted part performance of an alleged oral agreement to convey the Property to CDLF.
12.

The act of renovating the Property, however, was not clearly and definitely

referable exclusively to the alleged oral agreement. There was no renovation of the Property before the
March 23, 2001 letter offered that at the end of the Lease Agreement Dream Chaser would renew the
Lease Agreement for periods of ten years until the Lease Agreement was broken by CDLF or the
Property was no longer needed by CDLF. Carter Aff. Ex. 5. This promise was made over a month
before CDLF began renovating the Property. See Carter Aff. f 43 and Ex. 6. The renovation of the
Property, then, can easily be viewed as evidencing CDLFs intention to be subject to the offered longterm lease.
13.

CDLF's claimed part performance of the oral agreement can also be explained by

referring to the underlying Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement allowed CDLF "at its own cost and
expense" to "make such alteration in the building as [CDLF] may require for the conduct of its
business." Carter Aff. Ex. 116. The improvements to the Property were necessary to bring it into
compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. ff 8,16-17.
14.

That same section of the Lease Agreement further provided:
Any alterations or improvements to the Premises shall become the
property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this
Lease, except as herein otherwise provided.

Id. See also id. f 17 ("Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up . . . all of Tenant's improvements and
alterations, at the expiration, or sooner termination, of this Lease"). Thus, the Lease Agreement
allocated the risk to CDLF that any renovations it made would benefit Dream Chaser, the owner, upon
expiration or termination of the Lease Agreement.
15.

In Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981), the court held that plaintiffs

possession of the home which defendant orally promised to convey to him coupled with improvements
thereto did not constitute part performance where "plaintiffs possession of the property was not
exclusively referable to a contract of purchase, but was equally consonant with defendant's allegation of
a rental agreement." 624 P.2d at 715. See also Lloyd v. Price, 86 P. 770 (holding that plaintiffs
possession of property and making of improvements could reasonably be explained as merely for the
comfort and convenience of a tenant-at-will).
16.

Promissory estoppel is recognized as an exception to the statute of frauds only

"when a misrepresentation as to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the party
making the misrepresentation, i.e., the promise as to future conduct must constitute a manifestation that
the promissor will abandon an existing right which he possesses." McKinnon v. Corp. of the Pres. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1974). This narrow application of
the doctrine evidences the court's position that "[j]ust as the statute of frauds should not be used to
perpetrate fraud, so, too, promissory estoppel should not be allowed to eviscerate the statute of frauds.
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
17.

Any attempt by CDLF to argue promissory estoppel must fail because any oral

promise by Bonnie Carter to transfer title to the Property to CDLF did not constitute a manifestation by
Carter to abandon an existing right which she possessed. In fact, all but one of the factual predicates for

CDLF's allegation Bonnie Carter expressed an intent to convey title to the Property to CDLF, occurred
prior to the Property being transferred to Bonnie Carter/Dream Chaser. Because ownership of the
Property was not "an existing right" of Bonnie Carter or Dream Chaser, Bonnie Carter's statements of
intent to transfer title of the Property to CDLF could not constitute an exception to the statutes of fraud.
See Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 578 (holding that defendant was not barred from using the statute of frauds as
a defense, despite his earlier promises that he would transfer property to the plaintiff, because in making
these promises he did not express the intent to abandon an existing right).
18.

In Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., the court held that the defendant was not

estopped from asserting the statute of frauds where at no time did its conduct "clearly manifest an
intention that [it would] not assert the statute [of frauds]." Stangl, 948 P.2d at 365. See McKinnon, 529
P.2d at 437 (holding same)).
19.

Similar to the defendants in Stangl and McKinnon, here the Defendants' conduct

did not clearly manifest an intention to give up an existing right to the statute of frauds defense. Just the
opposite, the Defendants' formal written execution of a Lease Agreement with CDLF in December of
2000 and the March 23, 2001 letter sent to CDLF evidence an intent to protect the right to the protection
of the statute of frauds.
20.

Even if Defendants' conduct manifested an intent to give up an existing right, they

should not be estopped from claiming the statute of frauds as a defense because CDLF's reliance on
Bonnie Carter's representations that title to the Property would be transferred to CDLF was not
reasonable. In order to establish "promissory estoppel," a plaintiff must act with prudence and in
"reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant." Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc.,
989 P.2d 1077,1088 (Utah 1999) (citation omitted). Because CDLF did not begin renovating the

Property until well after Bonnie Carter sent the March 23, 2001 letter to CDLF, CDLF cannot establish
reasonable reliance. "The alleged promise must be reasonably certain and definite" Id. (citations
omitted). After the March 23, 2001 letter was sent, Bonnie Carter's prior statements as to an intent to
transfer title to the Property to CDLF, were far from "certain" or "definite." CDLF's reliance, therefore,
is unreasonable as a matter of law and cannot support a claim for promissory estoppel.
21.

CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in

June 2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other property, or to
purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand. First Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 5 ("it was
unlikely we would be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property").
22.

Here, CDLF's right to relief is not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to warrant this

Court granting the requested preliminary injunction. CDLF has not established that there is a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of contract claim.
23.

The allegation that underlies CDLF's claim that it has met the requirement of

irreparable harm depends on the speculative fear that the Migrant Head Start program operated on the
Property could not relocate to another facility and would have to close. Such speculative assertions of
harm are inadequate. System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983).
24.

CDLF's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that its Migrant Head Start

services at the Property ended on March 21, 2003 and are not scheduled to resume until June 1, 2003.
25.

Finally, the evidence indicates that CDLF has shut down other facilities and

worked with licensed providers to find day care for the affected children and successfully
accommodated a few children at another facility it operated. Carter Aff. Ex. 4.

26.

There is not sufficient evidence to establish that there was an agreement reached

between counsel for the parties to allow CDLF to occupy the Property during the pendency of litigation.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Motion to Enforce Stipulation are denied.
DATED this

day of May, 2003.
BY THE COURT

J. Dennis Frederick
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